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Moran v. State6/3/1998
erest" and not because it was in the child's best interest Ä how could the state even know what was in the child's best interest since they had not even seen him for several weeks, i.e., since the ran away from K Bar B on February 24, 1989. The state could have and should have brought in A.J. and charged him with juvenile delinquency. They knew he was out of control and yet failed to place him in a restrictive environment. Had they done so, none of this would have happened and this case would not be before the Court.
The Court can appreciate the fact that the personnel that worked with this young man made a "gallant attempt" at working this case, but once they realized that they had nothing more to offer him because of his obvious lack of cooperation, it was not appropriate for them to throw up their hands and surrender by placing him back into society. OCS knew or should have known that it was not in the child's best interest, nor was it in the best interest of society. The state must be held accountable for its actions/inactions and the Court finds it liable for plaintiff's damages, if any.
The Court further concludes that the state cannot find solace in the provisions of L.S.A.-R.S. 9:2798.1, in that the Court finds Section C thereof to be applicable and controlling.
Finally, the Court concludes that it will not apply the state's argument relative to the finality of the City Court Judgment of March 19, 1989, which terminated A.J.'s custody and supposedly the state's obligations/liability. To do so would be to allow the state to reap the rewards of its misdeeds. That Judgment contains "errors patent" in that OCS is responsible for acting in the best interest of a child and that interest is not served when it terminates its custody of an unrepresented runaway with the troubled history of A.J. Oubre.
The record indicates that A.J. had, for some time, been out of the custody and control of the State. According to the testimony of employees with the Office of Community Services, he would periodically disappear from the various placements which were made by the State. Even at those times when he would reappear at one of the many State placements from which he fled, the reappearance would be only short-lived before he would once again leave. His final instance of running away occurred in February 1989, at which time, the State did not know of his whereabouts. As the State found that it had nothing more to offer the teenaged A.J., according to testimony heard at trial, the Office of Community Services asked the court to release A.J. from their custody and such a release was provided in March 1989. This trial testimony also indicated, however, that despite this release, A.J. could have, in the future, requested the help of the State.
Under the above-described factual background, we conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the State owed a duty in this instance. Whether by operation of the court-ordered release or by his extended status as a runaway, A.J. was apparently not in the custody of the State. Therefore, the State cannot be expected to have exercised any type of supervision over a person whom it did not have in its custody. We further observe that, as a practical matter, it would obviously have been virtually impossible to do so.
Furthermore, any duty arguably owed in this matter would have been a duty owed to A.J. Our review of the jurisprudence reveals no duty owed by the State to generally protect the public from the actions of a runaway child who has previously been in its custody. Additionally, there is no indication that the State had any knowledge that could have given rise to a special duty, as the State apparently had n
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