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Moran v. State6/3/1998
o specific knowledge that A.J. might drive recklessly. Rather, the State only had knowledge that A.J. had general, although serious, behavioral problems. Nothing about the quality of this knowledge appears to give rise to a duty owed to the plaintiffs who, although friends and acquaintances of A.J., are owed no greater duty here than any that might be owed to the general public. To find the existence of a duty in this matter would make the State a comprehensive insurer for all of the bad acts of runaways formerly in their control and custody. We find no such overwhelming duty.
Even if we were to find that the State had, in some way, owed a duty in the instant matter, a final issue remains which would preclude recovery. La.R.S. 9:2798.1 provides that:
B. Liability shall not be imposed on public entities or their officers or employees based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform their policymaking or discretionary acts when such acts are within the course and scope of their lawful powers and duties.
C. The provisions of Subsection B of this Section are not applicable:
(1) To acts or omissions which are not reasonably related to the legitimate governmental objective for which the policymaking or discretionary power exists; or
(2) To acts or omissions which constitute criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, willful, outrageous, reckless, or flagrant misconduct.
As previously quoted, the trial Judge found that Subsection C of La.R.S. 9:2798.1 is applicable to the instant matter thereby prohibiting discretionary immunity. The trial Judge, however, did not state which aspect of Subsection C he found under the present factual scenario. Our review of the record indicates that, even if we were to conclude that liability existed, neither of the provisions of La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C) would be satisfied. Therefore, as asserted by the State, discretionary immunity would prohibit imposition of liability.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court is reversed as it relates to the appellants. Judgment is, therefore, rendered in favor of the defendants, the State of Louisiana through the Department of Health and Hospitals, Office of Community Services, Department of Social Services and/or Division of Children, Youth, and Family Services and Carol Sorich, dismissing Plaintiffs' demands against the said defendants, at Plaintiffs' costs. Costs of this appeal are assigned to the plaintiffs, Conrad Moran and Becky Daigle.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
THIBODEAUX, J., concurs and assigns written reasons.
COOKS, J., Dissents.
THIBODEAUX, Judge, Concurring.
I concur in the result reached. In my view, this cases involves the question of whether a legal cause, not a duty, existed which would have imposed liability on the state. I agree with the trial court that the state had the duty not to release the juvenile and to place him in a more restrictive environment. However, I do not believe that the scope of that duty encompassed the risk that the juvenile would have caused injuries to the plaintiffs under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, I do not believe that the state's liability, if any existed, would have been shielded under the discretionary immunity provided by La.R.S. 9:2798.1(C).
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