Bowden v. Caldor Inc.6/2/1998
the reduction of punitive damages awards, on the ground of excessiveness, without granting a new trial option. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Cliser, supra, 267 Md. at 425, 298 A.2d at 27. See also Heinze v. Murphy, supra, 180 Md. at 434, 24 A.2d at 923. Moreover, we have held that when the law imposes a limitation or cap upon damages, Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights does not preclude a court from reducing the jury's award of damages to such limitation or cap. Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 370-375, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (1992). Assuming arguendo that, under Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights, a court ordinarily may not reduce, on the ground on the ground of excessiveness, a jury's compensatory damages award without giving the plaintiff the option of a new trial, it would not follow that the same limitation is applicable to a jury's punitive damages award. As pointed out by Justice Scalia, Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., supra, 518 U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2235, 135 L.Ed.2d at 693 (Scalia, J., dissenting), the measure of compensatory damages suffered is essentially "a question of historical or predictive fact," whereas "the level of punitive damages is not . . . ." The factors limiting the size of punitive damages awards, discussed in part III of this opinion, are principles of law. The limits imposed upon awards of punitive damages, whether by Maryland common law or by federal constitutional law, are legal limits similar to statutory limitations or caps upon damages. See Murphy v. Edmonds, supra, 325 Md. at 371, 601 A.2d at 116, where this Court, in upholding a legal limitation upon non-economic damages, stated (emphasis added):
"As the wording of Article 23 itself indicates, the jury trial right in civil cases relates to 'issues of fact' in legal actions. It does not extend to issues of law, equitable issues, or matters which historically were resolved by the judge rather than the jury."
It is true that the limits imposed upon punitive damages involve the weighing of several legal principles, and thus are not as fixed as a statutory cap on a particular type of damages. Nevertheless the court, in applying legal principles to reduce a jury's punitive damages award, is performing a legal function and not acting as a second trier of fact. Although the function also involves the evidence in the case, it is similar to the legal function of granting a judgment notwithstanding a verdict. Consequently, we hold that Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights does not require a court, when it reduces a punitive damages award for excessiveness, to give the plaintiff the option of a new trial. Although the court, in its discretion, may grant a new trial option, it is not required to do so.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS VACATED, AND CASE RE- MANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO VACATE THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PRO- CEEDINGS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENT CALDOR, INC.
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