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Stafford v. Baker6/2/1998
icials did not act on this information, thereby resulting in his second release on 10 August 1993.
However, Lyons' criminal pattern of conduct persisted such that on 18 September 1993, he, for the third time, entered the Forsyth County Detention Center -- this time for failing to appear on a shop lifting charge and another misdemeanor. He posted a $50.00 cash bond and was released on 21 September 1993.
Four days later, Lyons fatally shot Stephen W. Stafford while robbing a grocery store in Forsyth County. On 4 April 1996, the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld his conviction for that crime (State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 468 S.E.2d 204 (1996)) and now Lyons awaits the execution of his death sentence in North Carolina Central Prison.
Mr. Stafford's wife, Ramona, acting as the Administratrix of his estate and in her individual capacity, sued the Sheriff of Forsyth County on his surety bond on 15 September 1995, alleging that her husband's death resulted from the negligent release of Lyons from the Forsyth County Detention Center. The sheriff answered and moved to dismiss Mrs. Stafford's complaint on the ground that the public duty doctrine barred her claim. Superior Court Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. denied that motion, however, on 5 December 1995.
Subsequent to the filing of the sheriff's answer, Mrs. Stafford amended her complaint as a matter of right to include a wrongful death claim that alleged that the sheriff negligently released Lyons from the Forsyth County Detention Center.
On 3 December 1996, the sheriff moved for summary judgment, contending that the public duty doctrine barred her claims. Thereafter, Superior Court Judge H. W. Zimmerman, Jr. granted summary judgment as to both claims. Mrs. Stafford now appeals to this Court.
I.
Wrongful Death Claim
Mrs. Stafford first contends that the trial court erred in applying the public duty doctrine to bar her wrongful death claim because, she argues, a "special relationship" existed between the Sheriff of Forsyth County and Lyons as contemplated by Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:
One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm.
Recognizing that Section 319 has not been adopted by our Supreme Court as an exception to the public duty doctrine, Mrs. Stafford urges this Court to formally adopt the reasoning set forth in Section 319 as a new "special relationship" exception to the public duty doctrine. For the reasons discussed below, we decline to do so.
Under the common law rule known as the "public duty doctrine," a municipality and its agents are deemed to act for the benefit of the general public rather than specific individuals. Braswell, 330 N.C. at 370, 410 S.E.2d at 901. Thus, ordinarily, the municipality or its agents may not be held liable to specific individuals for the failure to furnish them with police protection. Id. There are, however, two exceptions to public duty immunity which have been recognized by the courts of this State: (1) where there is a special relationship between the injured party and the agent or agency; and (2) where the agent or agency creates a special duty by promising protection to an individual, the protection is not forthcoming, and the individual's reliance on the promise is causally related to the injury suffered. Hedrick v. Rains, 121 N.C. App. 466, 470, 466 S.E.2d 281, 284, disc. review allowed, 343 N.C. 51, 472 S.E.2d 8 (1996)(quoting Sinning v. Clark, 119 N.
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