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Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corp.6/16/1998
This Court must determine whether the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 preempts a state common-law action. The lawsuit is against a manufacturer, based on the theory of defective design due to the absence of an air bag in a 1991 Toyota Tercel. We conclude that the plaintiffs' common-law claim was not preempted by the Congressional Safety Act under any of the propounded theories.
Supreme Court granted defendant Toyota Motor Corporation's motion for partial summary judgment. The Appellate Division reversed, denied the motion and reinstated the complaint against the Toyota defendants in its entirety. The Appellate Division granted Toyota leave to appeal, certifying the standard question as to the correctness of its order. Because our answer is that the intermediate appellate court ruled correctly, we now affirm its order.
I.
Plaintiff Caryn Drattel was injured while driving her 1991 Toyota Tercel. At the time of the accident, she was wearing both a shoulder harness and a lap seat belt. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer and distributors of the automobile (as well as the owner and driver of the other vehicle). Plaintiffs alleged defective design and failure to provide adequate safety protection, particularly because of the absence of a safer alternative design — a driver's side air bag.
Supreme Court found that plaintiff's state claims were preempted by federal law. The court relied principally on a Fourth Department, Appellate Division, case which found express preemption (see, Panarites v Williams, 216 AD2d 874, see also, Gardner v Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 145 AD2d 41, lv dismissed 74 NY2d 715). The Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department, reversed in the instant case, finding that plaintiffs' claims were not preempted (231 AD2d 326). The court concluded that based upon the language and purpose of the Safety Act, and its legislative history, Congress did not intend to preempt state common-law claims (id., at 328). Two Justices Dissented; they agreed with Supreme Court and urged the view that Congress intended to preempt common-law claims (id., at 330-334).
II.
In 1966, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (former 15 USC Section 1381 et seq. [recodified in 49 USC Section 30101 et seq. (1994) "without substantive change"]). Congress expressly declared that the purpose of the Safety Act was "to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents" (former 15 USC Section 1381; see, S.Rep.No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1966 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News 2709 [noting that the Act reflects "the soaring rate of death and debilitation on the Nation's highways"]). Congress determined that in order to achieve this stated goal it was "necessary to establish motor vehicle safety standards for motor vehicles and equipment in interstate commerce" (former 15 USC Section 1381).
Congress defined the term "safety standard" as "a minimum standard for motor vehicle performance, or motor vehicle equipment performance, which is practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which provides objective criteria" (former 15 USC Section 1391 [emphasis added]). Solely at issue in the instant case is Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 (49 CFR Section 571.208). It gives automobile manufacturers three options to comply with the minimum safety standards, the installation of air bags being just one of the alternatives.
The Safety Act includes two sections that are critical to resolving this case. First, the preemption clause states:
"Whenever a Federal motor vehicle safety standard established under this
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