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Bruner v. Sobel6/23/1998
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
BRUNER v. SOBEL
___P.2d___
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIVISION I
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TULSA COUNTY,
STATE OF OKLAHOMA
HONORABLE JANE P. WISEMAN, TRIAL JUDGE
The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee in this automobile accident/personal injury case on the basis the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitation. The trial Judge rejected appellant's argument the "savings statute" found at 12 O. S. 1991, Section 100 allowed him one year from dismissal of a timely brought prior suit to commence the instant suit. The rejection was based on the fact the original two-year limitation period had not expired at the time of the prior suit's dismissal. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. Held: It was error to grant summary judgment to appellee because Section 100 gave appellant one year from the prior suit's dismissal to file a new action against appellee regardless of the fact there was time remaining in the initial two-year limitation period when the prior suit was dismissed.
CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED;
COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION VACATED;
TRIAL COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND MATTER REMANDED.
The issue before us in this case is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee, Amanda Sobel, in this automobile accident/personal injury case on the basis the suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitation and in rejecting appellant, Christopher Bruner's argument the "savings statute" found at 12 O. S. 1991, Section 100 allowed him one year from dismissal of a timely brought prior suit to commence a new action against appellee. The rejection was based on the fact the original two-year limitation period had not yet expired at the time of the prior suit's dismissal and, therefore, appellant still had remaining time within the two-year limitation period to timely commence a new suit after the first action's dismissal.
We hold the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee, as did the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA) in affirming the trial Judge's ruling. It was error to grant summary judgment to appellee because Section 100 did give appellant one year from the prior suit's dismissal to file a new action against appellee, regardless of the fact the two-year limitation period had not yet expired at the time of the prior suit's dismissal, i.e. even though when the prior suit was dismissed time remained in the initial two-year limitation period to commence a new action. The error of both the trial court and the COCA was a failure to give proper consideration to a 1975 legislative amendment to Section 100 and the mistaken reliance on pre-1975 jurisprudence from this Court, as we explain below.
PART I. FACTS AND POSITIONS OF PARTIES.
An automobile accident involving appellee and appellant occurred on April 26, 1993. An initial petition was filed by appellant in regard to the accident on January 14, 1994 in Tulsa County District Court claiming appellee's negligence caused the accident and, consequently, personal injuries to appellant. On August 25, 1994 appellant dismissed without prejudice this initial suit against appellee. On August 22, 1995 a new action was filed by appellant against appellee, i.e. about four months after the applicable statute of limitation found at 12 O. S. Supp. 1997, Section 95(3) expired, but within one year from the
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