 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone6/5/1998
anguish damages on very little solid evidence cannot even hear evidence of potential punitive damage exposure. To the question, can a jury hear evidence of possible future suffering in determining future mental anguish, the Court would unhesitatingly answer yes. To the question, can a jury hear evidence of lost future earning capacity based on how long a plaintiff is likely to live and work, the Court's answer would likewise be unequivocally affirmative. To the question, can a jury hear evidence of potential punitive damages exposure based on experience to date, the Court answers no. If any principle joins these positions, it is stretched far too thin to be visible.
While I certainly do not argue for the admission of speculative evidence in these or any other cases, it seems to me that the Restatement is exactly right in suggesting that evidence of a future risk of punitive damages can be definite enough to be submitted to the jury. When a party has defended multiple lawsuits arising out of the same subject matter, a sufficient pattern of awards and payments may develop for future liability to be estimated with reasonable reliability. In such instances I see no reason why a jury should be kept any more ignorant of the evidence than, say, the defendant's potential investors or lenders. Indeed, it would be improper to exclude such evidence. If it is essential that potential investors in a public company know its risks of liability for punitive damages (as well as actual damages), why is that same information irrelevant to a jury in assessing punitive damages? On the other hand, I can just as easily conceive of circumstances in which the risk of potential puniote or speculative that the probative value of any evidence the jury could be given would be far outweighed by its likely prejudicial effect. Comment e does not prohibit exclusion of evidence of future punitive damages awards; it only allows admission of such evidence. That the risk of punitive damages liability may sometimes be uncertain is reason to exclude particular evidence, but no reason to abolish the rule allowing it in other circumstances.
The second reason that the Court gives for rejecting the Restatement position is that others have. Again, that is true, but those who have are in a distinct minority. The weight of authority, not surprisingly, supports the Restatement.
The Model Uniform Products Liability Act recognizes a defendant's potential exposure to other claims for punitive damages and other sanctions among the factors to be considered by the court in fixing the amount of punitive damages. The Act calls for consideration of "the total effect of other punishment imposed or likely to be imposed upon the product seller as a result of the misconduct, including punitive damage awards to persons similarly situated to the claimant and the severity of criminal penalties to which the product seller has been or may be subjected". As the accompanying analysis explains, the Act draws from an earlier Minnesota statute, which in turn drew upon the factors suggested by Professor David G. Owen in 1976. At least Kansas, Oregon, Minnesota, Mississippi, and Montana all have similar statutory language.
Case law, too, recognizes the relevance of past and potential exposure to additional awards for the same misconduct as an antidote to overkill concerns, sometimes as part of the review applied by courts, and other times as relevant evidence which could be presented to a jury. High courts in at least seven states - Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, Oregon, West Virginia, and Wisconsin - have noted the significance of such awards. Comment e has also been favorably viewed in numerous intermediate appellate
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|