 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Macias v. Texas Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association6/17/1998
From the 166th Judicial District Court of Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 92-CI-15430
Honorable Michael Peden, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Tom Rickhoff, Justice
Dissenting opinion by: Sarah B. Duncan, Justice
REVERSED and REMANDED
Jose Macias suffered a work-related injury on March 3, 1990. On October 3, 1990, while participating in a work-hardening program at his employer's direction, Macias suffered another injury. On May 14, 1991 Macias signed a Compromise Settlement Agreement ("CSA"); on August 16, 1991 he filed a claim for the October injury. After the Texas Workers' Compensation Commission denied his claim for the October injury, Macias filed suit. Employers Casualty Co. ("Employers") sought summary judgment, claiming both that the May agreement settled both the March and October injuries, and that the October injury related back to the March injury and therefore Macias could not maintain a separate action for the October injury. A general summary judgment was granted.
In three points of error Macias argues that he was not estopped from filing a separate claim for the October 3 injury; that the CSA did not include the October injury; and that the summary judgment affidavit relied on by Employers was inadequate.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In deciding whether a disputed material fact issue precludes summary judgment, the reviewing court will take as true all evidence favoring the nonmoving; every reasonable inference from the evidence will be indulged in favor of the nonmoving, and any doubts will be resolved in his favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549. If the order is general, without specifying the grounds on which the trial court granted summary judgment, the nonmoving party on appeal must negate any grounds on which the trial court could have granted summary judgment. Malooly Brothers, Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970); Sipes v. Petry & Stewart, 812 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action is entitled to summary judgment. Wornick Co. v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 733 (Tex. 1993). A defendant may also show entitlement to summary judgment by conclusively proving all elements of an affirmative defense. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1984); Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S. W.2d 64, 67 (Tex. 1972).
It is well-settled that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed in favor of the worker . Lujan v. Houston General Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1988). The act should not be hedged about with strict construction, but should be given a liberal construction to carry out its evident purpose. Id. (citing Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Retirement & Nursing Center, 701 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1985)).
THE COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Because the incident in question occurred before Jan. 1, 1991, this cause of action is governed by Texas' prior workers' compensation law. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon 1967), repealed by Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 71st Leg., 2nd C.S., ch. 1, Sec 16, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 114 (eff. Jan. 1, 1991). Under this law, any compromise settlement agreement between an injured worker and the insuror binds the parties only as to those matters covered by its express terms. Gar
Page 1 2 3 Texas Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|