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Talasazan v. Northridge Arena Soccer League12/4/2002
ot apply when one player intentionally injures another, however. (Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 318- 320 [citing with approval Griggas v. Clauson (1955) 6 Ill.App.2d 412, where one basketball player wantonly assaulted another during a game].) The doctrine is obviously inapplicable here, where Talasazan was the victim of an unprovoked post-game attack.
4. Release of Liability
Talasazan's League application form included a release of liability that stated: "I . . . hereby . . . consent and agree to release, indemnify and hold harmless the [League], all personal including officials, staff, officers, agents and owners from any claim arising from personal injury or property damage to the named individual. I understand that the [League] does not carry insurance to cover participants in the activity in which I am registered. I understand the hardness of the playing surfaces and dasher boards, the different and unique characteristics of the artificial turf when wet or dry ( opposed to grass), and the roughness of the sport. I grant [the League] the right to photograph or video the players in participating soccer activities and to use the photographs or video in future brochures and/or commercials." Respondents contend that by signing this form, Talasazan waived his right to sue for injuries sustained in the fight.
Normal contract principles apply when construing a release and the meaning of its language is ordinarily a legal question. A prior release must be clear, unambiguous and explicit, and a release effective as to one type of misconduct may not apply to others. A prior release is strictly interpreted in favor of the party releasing liability and, in accordance with the normal rules of contract interpretation, ambiguities in a release should be construed against the drafter. An ambiguity exists when a party can identify a semantically reasonable alternative interpretation. (Solis v. Kirkwood Resort Co. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 354, 360.)
With this in mind, we first agree with the trial court that the release did not apply to the Club. The release was part of Talasazan's application to play in the League and applies to the League and all personnel, including officials, staff, officers, agents and owners. It seems clear to us that this language applied to owners of the League, not the owners of the Club.
Assuming that the release applied to both the Club and the League, we hold that it did not extend to this incident. Although the release initially speaks of "any claim arising from personal injury ," that phrase is soon followed by a description of certain hazards posed by specific field conditions along with the "roughness of the sport." This language reasonably could be read to limit the release to those risks inherent in the sport itself. Given this ambiguity, we interpret it to exclude claims based on risks that are not inherent in the sport, such as a wanton physical assault by an opposing player after the game has ended.
DISPOSITION
For the reasons set forth above, the judgments for respondents are reversed. Appellant to recover his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
We concur:
COOPER, P.J.
BOLAND, J.
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