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Buckley Powder Co. v. State12/19/2002
ompensation did not depend on his conclusion.
Second, the special master's compensation did not become contingent on the existence of a common fund after the trial court ordered that the state begin paying him. Under the court's order, the state would receive a credit for payments against the common fund. However, had the trial court ultimately ruled against a common fund, either the special master would already have been paid or the court could have used C.R.C.P. 53(a) to order that the judicial department pay any remaining balance. Moreover, during the last hearing on use of a common fund, the state acquiesced in the trial court's proposal that the state advance compensation.
We thus decline to disturb the common fund on appeal.
VII. Costs of the State
We reject the state's argument for recovery of its reasonable costs under § 13-17-202, C.R.S. 2002.
Section 13-17-202(1)(a)(II), C.R.S. 2002, requires a plaintiff to pay the defendant actual costs if the defendant offers, at least ten days before trial, to settle with the plaintiff and the plaintiff recovers less than the settlement offer at final judgment.
Here, the state admits it would not be entitled to recover costs if we affirm the trial court's class damages award because the state only offered to settle with Buckley individually.
Because we have affirmed the trial court's class certification and damages award, we conclude the state is not entitled to its actual costs under § 13-17-202(1)(a)(II).
VIII. Buckley's Attorney Fees
On cross-appeal, Buckley first contends the trial court erred in imposing the $250,000 attorney fees cap under § 13-17-203 because the statute does not apply here and is unconstitutional. We disagree. A. Application of § 13-17-203
We reject Buckley's argument that the trial court erred when it limited attorney fees based on § 13-17-203.
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Colo. State Bd. of Accountancy v. Paroske, 39 P.3d 1283 (Colo. App. 2001).
When interpreting a statute, our primary responsibility is to determine the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Cooper, 27 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2001). We begin with the statute's language, which we afford its ordinary and common meaning. We construe statutes as a whole, give effect to every word, and resist forced or strained constructions. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263 (Colo. 2001).
If a separate clause within a statute can be reconciled using one interpretation but would conflict under another, we adopt the interpretation allowing for consistency. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986).
We look to legislative history and other extrinsic factors only if the statute is ambiguous or portions of the statute may conflict. People v. Cooper, supra.
Section 13-17-203 provides:
If the plaintiffs prevail in any class action litigation brought against any public entity . . . the amount of attorney fees which the plaintiffs' attorney is entitled to receive out of any award to the plaintiffs shall be determined by the court; except that such amount shall not exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars. Such limitation shall apply where the public entity pays the attorney fees directly to the plaintiffs' attorneys or where the public entity is required to pay the attorney fees indirectly through any program it administers by reducing the benefits or amounts due to the individual plaintiffs.
We perceive no ambiguity in this language. The statute applies to attorney fees in "any class action" against "any
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