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Davenport v. City and County of Honolulu12/30/2002
t that work-related injuries be considered as a cost of doing business." Davenport I, No. 23141, slip op. at 22. The ICA highlighted the point made in Mitchell that, because HRS § 386-3 did not expressly exclude injuries arising out of disciplinary actions from coverage, the court could not "unilaterally pronounce" an exception. Thus, the ICA held that, " nder the logic of Mitchell, . . . the psychological injury arising out of the non-disciplinary promotion and demotion at issue here would appear to be compensable under HRS § 386-3." Id. at 24.
The ICA then turned its analysis to the legislative history that surrounded the amendment to HRS § 386-3, enacted in response to Mitchell. Shortly after Mitchell was decided, the legislature added subsection c to HRS § 386-3, which provides that " claim for mental stress resulting solely from disciplinary action taken in good faith by the employer shall not be allowed[.]" HRS § 386-3(c) (1998). The ICA noted that the legislative history surrounding the amendment showed that the legislature considered and rejected extending the amendment to exclude coverage of personnel actions. Thus, the ICA stated, " t is apparent from the legislative history [that] . . . the legislature assumes that psychological injuries engendered by other kinds of non-disciplinary personnel actions, such as promotions and demotions, arise out of and in the course of employment." Davenport I, No. 23141, slip op. at 26.
On appeal to this court, the Department alleges that the ICA committed the following grave errors of law: (1) the ICA failed to apply the clearly erroneous standard of review to the Board's findings; (2) the ICA failed to apply the unitary work connection test for determining compensability; (3) the ICA's reliance on legislative history regarding HRS § 386-3(c) is misplaced; and (4) the ICA erred by remanding the April 1995 claim for a redetermination of compensability because the issue of whether the April 1995 claim was a direct and natural result of his previous Achilles tendon claim was never at issue before the Board.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW A. Board Decisions
Appellate review of Board decisions is governed by HRS § 91-14(g) (1993). Korsak v. Hawaii Permanente Medical Group, 94 Hawaii 297, 302, 12 P.3d 1238, 1243 (2000). The Board's findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard in view of the "reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record." Id. at 302-03, 12 P.3d at 1243-44 (brackets and citation omitted). "The clearly erroneous standard requires the court to sustain the [Board's] findings unless the court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. (citation omitted). However, the Board's conclusions of law cannot bind an appellate court and are "freely reviewable for [their] correctness. Thus, the court reviews [conclusions of law] de novo, under the right/wrong standard." Id. (citation omitted).
B. Statutory Interpretation
The interpretation of a statute is a de novo inquiry for the appellate court.
When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose. . . . This court may also consider the reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning. Id. at 303, 12 P.3d at 1244 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. January 14, 1
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