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Davenport v. City and County of Honolulu12/30/2002
ry 14, 1994 injury." Board's Amended Decision at 9. Thus, the Board did not clearly err in finding that the alleged harassment did not contribute to Davenport's injuries, and we analyze Davenport's claim as if it arose solely out of his frustrations with the Civil Service administrative appeals process.
2. Application of Mitchell
The determination of what injuries are compensable under Hawaii's worker's compensation statute is governed by HRS § 386-3(a), which provides:
If an employee suffers personal injury either by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment or by disease proximately caused by or resulting from the nature of the employment, the employee's employer or the special compensation fund shall pay compensation to the employee or the employee's dependents as provided in this chapter. HRS § 386-3(a) (emphasis added).
In interpreting this statue, the ICA relied primarily on Mitchell, 85 Hawaii 250, 942 P.2d 514. Mitchell involved a teacher who sought compensation for psychological injuries sustained from disciplinary action taken against her for violating a school rule. Id. The issue before the court in Mitchell was " hether an employee's stress-related injury resulting from disciplinary action taken by an employer in response to an employee's misconduct is a compensable injury under HRS § 386-3." Id. at 254, 942 P.2d at 518. We held that Mitchell's injuries were compensable because her misconduct involved a violation of school rules relating to the "method of accomplishing . . . ultimate work" and was thus within the course of her employment. Id. at 255-56, 942 P.2d at 519-20. We went on to note that other statutes provided express provisions to exclude from coverage stress-related injuries resulting from good faith disciplinary actions. Thus, we held that " n the absence of an express exception in HRS § 386-3 we cannot unilaterally pronounce one. To do so would run counter to the clear import of HRS § 386-3." Id. at 257, 942 P.2d at 521.
As discussed above, the ICA relied on Mitchell in holding that, in light of the policy to construe chapter 386 broadly and the lack of an express exception for non-coverage of injuries deriving from personnel actions, psychological injuries arising out of non-disciplinary personnel actions are compensable under HRS § 386-3. Davenport I, No. 23141, slip op. at 23. This application of Mitchell to the present case, however, is misplaced.
In reading Mitchell broadly, we hold that the ICA's interpretation of Mitchell is overbroad. In Mitchell we held that the court must look at the reason for the disciplinary action and whether it relates to the method of accomplishing the ultimate work. We did not hold that all disciplinary actions are covered by HRS § 386-3, but rather, that the statute did not expressly exclude injuries arising out of disciplinary actions from coverage. Mitchell, 85 Hawaii at 255-57, 942 P.2d at 519-21. Thus, Mitchell stood for the proposition that an individual who has sustained a psychological injury resulting from legitimate disciplinary action was not precluded from recovering under the worker's compensation statute.
We then asked whether the action that gave rise to the discipline arose out of and in the course of employment. We specifically pointed to the distinction in Mitchell that made the injury in that case compensable. We compared Mitchell to our decision in Wharton v. Hawaiian Electric Company, Inc., 80 Hawaii 120, 906 P.2d 127 (1995), where an employee suffered psychological injuries after being disciplined for the unauthorized alteration of his time card. We found that Wharton's injury was not compensable because his action of altering
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