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Austin v. Universal Cheerleaders Association12/17/2002
Reporter of Decisions
Argued: November 14, 2002
Universal Cheerleaders Association (Universal) appeals from an in limine order of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Marden, J.) regarding the jury verdict form to be used in this personal injury lawsuit. Universal contends that (1) the court's order is an appealable order even though it is not a final judgment, and (2) the court erroneously deprived Universal of the right to choose between requesting apportionment of liability or taking a setoff in the amount the City of Augusta, also a defendant in this action, paid the plaintiff in exchange for a "Pierringer" release. See Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963). We dismiss the appeal and do not reach the Pierringer release issue because the appeal is interlocutory and does not satisfy any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule.
I. BACKGROUND
Nancy Austin, the mother of Serenity Soiett, alleges that in December 1995 her daughter was seriously injured after she fell backward and hit her head while practicing a stunt at a cheerleading clinic. Austin brought suit on behalf of Serenity, who was then age fourteen, against Universal, which ran the clinic, and the City of Augusta, which sponsored Serenity's participation in the clinic. The City settled with Austin, paying her $290,000 in exchange for Austin signing a Pierringer release. A Pierringer release enables a plaintiff to settle with one defendant without releasing a non-settling defendant from liability, allowing the settling defendant to avoid becoming liable to the non-settling defendant for contribution or indemnity claims. Thurston v. 3K Kamper Ko., Inc., 482 A.2d 837, 839 n.1 (Me. 1984).
At a trial management conference, Universal argued that because of the Pierringer release signed by Austin, it was entitled, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 156, 163 (Supp. 2001), to choose between requesting apportionment of responsibility or receiving a setoff. The Superior Court ruled that because one party—the plaintiff—had requested it, the jury verdict form would contain appropriate interrogatories to provide for allocation of responsibility between the settling and non-settling defendants. Universal responded by filing a motion with the Superior Court, pursuant to M.R. App. P. 24(c), asking the court to report the issue addressed in the in limine order to us. When the Superior Court denied its motion to report, Universal appealed the in limine order. Austin, in turn, moved to dismiss Universal's appeal, asserting that it was an impermissible interlocutory appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
With limited exceptions, a party may not appeal a decision until a final judgment has been rendered in the case. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric., Rural Hous. Serv. v. Carter, 2002 ME 103, 7, 799 A.2d 1232, 1234. This Court has recognized three exceptions to our final judgment rule: (1) the death knell exception; (2) the collateral order exception; and (3) the judicial economy exception. Id. Universal's appeal does not fall within any of these exceptions.
The death knell exception to the final judgment rule enables a party to appeal an interlocutory order if "'substantial rights of a party will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment.'" Id. 12, 799 A.2d at 1235 (quoting Webb v. Haas, 1999 ME 74, 5, 728 A.2d 1261, 1264). Because the court's action with respect to the jury verdict form will be reviewable after judgment if the issue is properly preserved, the death knell exception is inapplicable to Universal's appeal.
To fall within the collateral order exception, Universal must establish three requirements: "(1) the
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