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Dicicco v. Jurkiw12/27/2002
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiff, David Dicicco, appeals as of right the trial court's grant of summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendants, Christopher Jurkiw ("Jurkiw") and Renay Jurkiw , in this automobile-related personal injury claim. We reverse and remand. This appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
This accident occurred at approximately 2:00 a.m. on December 5, 1999, on northbound 1-75 in Detroit. Defendant Ionescu was driving plaintiff's 1999 Jeep Cherokee. Plaintiff, a front seat passenger in the car, admitted that he had no personal recollection of the circumstances of the accident. Apparently, he had been drinking heavily that evening and had fallen asleep in the car. According to Ionescu, the accident occurred on a four lane portion of I-75 where the speed limit was 65 miles per hour. The traffic was moderate, with cars in all four lanes and the road was wet. Ionescu was going 66 miles per hour in the far left lane. Jurkiw drove past him on the right at a high rate of speed while swerving through traffic without using his turn signals. Jurkiw entered the left lane in front of Ionescu and then tried to cut back into the lane next to him.
Jurkiw did not see that there was a car in that lane and was forced to try to return to the left lane. Jurkiw lost control and his car spun across the lanes and into the wall at the far right shoulder of the road. This occurred within 70 yards in front of Ionescu.
Ionescu took his foot from the gas pedal and tried to avoid the vehicles in front of him which were also slowing down. He began braking and tried to swerve when he saw the cars stopping in front of him but he began to slide. He was unable to keep from hitting the van in front of him. The van was moving when the impact occurred. Ionescu did not recall seeing either brake or tail lights illuminating the rear of the van. After he hit the rear end of the van, another individual hit the rear end of plaintiff's car. The driver of the van left the scene without waiting for the police. Plaintiff, who was not wearing his seatbelt at the time, suffered a fractured right wrist.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary disposition on the ground that Jurkiw did not owe a duty to plaintiff because Jurkiw was not in a special relationship with plaintiff. See e.g., Welke v Kuzilla, 140 Mich App 658; 365 NW2d 205 (1985). Defendants essentially concede the trial court's error and admit that Jurkiw had "at least some basic duty to operate his vehicle in a reasonably safe manner." See Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 95; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Zarzecki v Hatch, 347 Mich 138, 141; 79 NW2d 605 (1956).
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in finding that reasonable minds could not differ as to whether Jurkiw's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. We agree.
Proximate cause is an issue for the court only when the facts are not in dispute and reasonable minds could not differ about applying the legal concept of proximate cause to those facts. Rogalski v Tavernier, 208 Mich App 302, 306; 527 NW2d 73 (1995). Proving causation actually entails proof of both cause in fact and proximate cause. Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 162-163; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). This Court has defined proximate cause as "that which operates to produce particular consequences without the intervention of any independent, unforeseen cause, without which the injuries would not have occurred." Helmus v Dep't of Transportation, 238 Mich App 250, 256; 604 NW2d 793 (1999).
There can be more than one proximate cau
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