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Jones v. General Motors Corporation12/20/2002
UNPUBLISHED
In this case arising as a result of an automobile accident, defendant appeals as of right from the judgment entered after a jury verdict in favor of plaintiffs. We affirm.
In April 1995, plaintiff Rodney Jones (hereinafter "Jones") sustained serious injuries when a Ford Aerostar minivan collided with the full-size 1985 Chevrolet van that plaintiff was driving. Plaintiff's van spun around and rolled twice, coming to rest upright. At some point while the van was rolling, plaintiff was ejected from the van and landed in the street.
On March 26, 1996, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging product liability, negligence, breach of express and implied warranties, and loss of consortium. Of significance, Jones and his wife Brenda alleged in their complaint that Jones was wearing his seatbelt when the accident occurred: Jones "was utilizing the vehicle equipped door mounted shoulder and lap safety belt system, but the shoulder safety belt and lap safety belt both failed to act, allowing [Jones] to be ejected from the motor vehicle." A jury trial commenced in September 1999, during which the primarily contested fact issues were whether Jones had his seatbelt on at the time of the collision and whether the seatbelt buckle "inertially unlatched." After deliberations, the jury found, among other things, that defendant was negligent in the design of the 1985 Chevrolet G-van "in one or more of the ways claimed by laintiff," that defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries, that Jones too was negligent, that his negligence was a proximate cause of his injury, and that the percentage of fault attributable to Jones was twenty-five percent and to defendant was seventy-five percent. Thereafter, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs in the amount of $1,825,595. Defendant moved for a new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal ensued.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting two types of evidence, those being General Motors' crash tests involving "N-cars" and testimony from two witnesses who claimed that they were involved in accidents where their seatbelts failed. Defendant claims that the disputed evidence should not have been admitted at trial because the circumstances in both categories were not substantially similar to the accident in the present case and that this evidence did not come into existence until after Jones' van was designed and manufactured.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's evidentiary decisions. Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 457 Mich 593, 614; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). In civil cases, an abuse of discretion occurs only when the result is so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences the perversity of will, a defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. Dep't of Transportation v Randolph, 461 Mich 757, 768; 610 NW2d 893 (2000); Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 325; 628 NW2d 63 (2001). Courts are reluctant to overturn a jury's verdict when there is ample evidence to support it, and reversal will not be premised on an erroneous evidentiary ruling unless the failure to do so would be inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); MRE 103(a); Krohn v Sedgwick James of Michigan, Inc, 244 Mich App 289, 295; 624 NW2d 212 (2001).
We turn first to defendant's argument that no substantial similarity existed between the circumstances in the present case and those concerning the N-cars and the witnesses' testimony and thus the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial and should have been excluded. With respect to the N-car crash tests, defendant's argument is two-pronged: (1)
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