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Hancock v. Independent School District No. 28112/3/2002
In this premises liability personal injury dispute, appellant Independent School District #281 challenges the denial of its summary judgment motion, alleging that the decision to replace non-safety glass only when the glass is broken is a policy decision entitled to statutory discretionary immunity. We affirm.
FACTS
On Marchá16, 1998, respondent Kyle Hancock (Hancock) was a member of the Armstrong High School track team. He was injured when he attempted to leave the school building through a glass door to head outside for track practice. As he pushed on the door, the glass shattered and he sustained lacerations to his face and wrists. Hancock brought this premises liability personal injury action, alleging that appellant school district's (school district) negligent maintenance, inspection, operation and repair caused the accident.
School district contends that in 1985, the building codes in Minnesota were changed, and all doors and windows installed after that date were required to be glazed with tempered "safety" glass. However, according to school district, non-tempered glass in place as of 1985 could remain. School district further claims that it continually makes decisions concerning the best use of its limited funds and, after balancing the needs of its students against its budgetary concerns, it has continually decided not to replace its non-tempered glass windows and doors with tempered "safety" glass except to replace broken glass.
School district moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that this glass-replacement decision or policy was entitled to statutory discretionary immunity pursuant to Minn. Stat. §á466.03, subd. 6 (2002). The district court denied school district's motion and this appeal followed.
DECISION
Rule 56.03 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure allows for a grant of summary judgment if, upon examination of the record, "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. When reviewing a district court's summary judgment ruling, this court looks for two things: (1) genuine issues of material fact; and (2) proper application of the law by the district court. State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990). Evidence is considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and any doubts about material facts are resolved in its favor. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666, 672 (Minn. 2001). To survive a motion for summary judgment, however, the non-moving party must do more than create a mere "metaphysical doubt" as to the facts. Id. at 703. The non-moving party must point to probative substantial evidence in the record supporting its claim. Id.
Generally, government entities are subject to tort liability. Minn. Stat. §á466.02 (2002). A narrow exception to this rule insulates governmental bodies from liability under certain circumstances. Minn. Stat. §á466.03 (2002). Specifically, subdivisioná6 provides immunity from " ny claim based upon the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." Id., subd.á6. To determine whether the immunity applies, the Minnesota supreme court "has employed the distinction between policymaking activities (which are protected) and operational activities (which are not)." Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Minn. 1992) (citation omitted). Whether immunity applies is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 582 N.W.2d 216, 219 (Minn. 1998). "The discretionary function exception is interpreted narrowly." Conlin v. City of Saint Paul,
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