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State ex rel Kertz12/10/2002
hrough which the line of road passes and in which it has an agent upon whom process can be served." Thus, in the absence of any other definition of the residence of a railroad corporation under section 508.010(2), the pre-1943 "existing laws" control, and St. Louis City, through which BNSF's line of road passes and where BNSF offices and agents are located, is a residence of the railroad.
This case is remarkably similar to State ex rel. Smith v. Gray, 979 S.W.2d 190 (Mo. banc 1998), another venue case under section 508.010(2), in which this Court refused to apply the section 351.375.3, RSMo 1994 (now codified as section 351.375.2), definition of corporate residence to an insurance company that would have limited venue to the county where the company's registered office was maintained. Specifically, this Court held that section 351.375.3 is qualified by section 351.690(2), RSMo 1994 (now codified as section 351.690(3)), which states that " o provisions of this law [with certain exceptions] shall be applicable to . . . insurance companies. . . ," and then concluded that in the absence of statutory guidance, the common law definition of the residence of insurance companies should apply. Id. at 192-93. The rationale holds true here as well because the two qualifying subsections -- 351.690(3) for insurance companies and 351.690(4) for railroad companies -- both preclude application of the residency definition set out in section 351.375.2.
For the foregoing reasons, the alternative writ of mandamus is made absolute, and respondent is ordered to withdraw her order transferring the case to St. Louis County and to reinstate the case in St. Louis City.
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