 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Howard v. Vaughn12/31/2002
d, in open court and in chambers as the resident judge or any judge regularly assigned to hold the courts of the district or set of districts as defined in G.S. 7A 41.1(a) has, and his jurisdiction in chambers shall extend until the session is adjourned or the session expires by operation of law, whichever is later. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-47 (2001) (emphasis added).
Pursuant to Section 7A-47, Judge Beal, a regular superior court judge assigned to hold court in Mecklenburg County, had the same powers as a superior court judge who was a resident of that county. Obviously, not all North Carolina counties have superior court judges domiciled within their boundaries. Some citizens of our state, under the interpretation of Rule 9(j) proffered by defendants, would therefore be precluded from ever obtaining the extension, while citizens of other counties would have ample opportunities to avail themselves of the statute's benefits. Particularly in many of our small, rural and often economically deprived areas, the good citizens would be without recourse, thus implicating the equal protection clause of the North Carolina Constitution.
Further, in instances where one judge overrules another, the proper remedy would be for the defendant to come to this Court rather than seek to have the earlier judge overruled. Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 34, 38, 415 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1992). " t is well established that `no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another's errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge made in the same action.'" Atkinson v. Atkinson, 132 N.C. App. 82, 88, 510 S.E.2d 178, 181, overruled on other grounds, 350 N.C. 590, 516 S.E.2d 381 (1999).
Here, the applicable statute of limitations would not have been violated through Monday, 21 August 2000. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-53(4). Under Rule 9(j), a proper order extended the statute of limitations through 11 December 2000. Plaintiff filed her complaint on 8 December 2000. Accordingly, we reverse for proceedings consistent with the opinion and remand the order of the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges WALKER and BIGGS concur.
|