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Everett v. State Farm Indemnity Co.12/31/2002
arlier[;] provided, however, that if benefits have been paid before then an action for further benefits may be commenced not later than two years after the last payment of benefits. [N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1a (emphasis added).]
We begin our analysis by examining the underlying purpose of the No-Fault Insurance Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35, which is to assure that an injured plaintiff is promptly compensated for medical treatment resulting from injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 162 N.J. 318, 323 (2000) (citation omitted). When the Act was initially passed it did not contain a statute of limitations provision; the Legislature originally relied upon the general two-year statute of limitations period applicable to personal injury actions. See N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2; Danilla v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 168 N.J. Super. 515, 519 (App. Div. 1979). The Act was later amended to include N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1.
In general terms, statutes of limitations, including those set forth in N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1, are based on goals of "achieving security and stability in human affairs and ensuring that cases are not tried on the basis of stale evidence." Zaccardi v. Becker, 88 N.J. 245, 256 (1982) (citations omitted). A statute of limitations has two purposes. The first is to stimulate litigants to pursue a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party may have a fair opportunity to defend, thus preventing the litigation of stale claims. The second function is to penalize dilatoriness and serve as a measure of repose. [Ochs v. Fed. Ins. Co., 90 N.J. 108, 112 (1982) (citations and quotations omitted).]
In discussing the meaning of N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1, the Ochs Court noted:
Significantly, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-13.1 comes into play when the insured is pursuing an action for personal injury protection benefits in the face of non-payment of benefits claimed to be due from the insurer. It affects only whether or not an action may be maintained; once payment is determined to be due, the statute does not place any time limitations on the payment of future benefits.
. . . . suit to recover PIP benefits seeks essentially a declaration of liability. It is not necessary to present an enumeration of the specific expenses. Once liability is established, the carrier is responsible for all medical expenses related to the accident. [Id. at 114-15.]
In Washington v. Mkt. Transition Facility, 295 N.J. Super. 368, 369 (App. Div. 1996), the issue addressed was "when does the statute begin to run where the insurer makes a voluntary partial payment of medical expenses." Concluding that the triggering event was the last payment actually made, Judge Pressler stated:
The statute places no qualification on the condition of 'last payment of benefits.' A plain, literal and common-sense reading of the statute can only mean the last time any payment was made on account of the injuries sustained in the accident. We are also satisfied that a plain-meaning reading of the statute accords with legislative policy in enacting no-fault legislation, namely, the assurance of prompt and complete medical-expense payment to persons injured in automobile accidents. . . . In short, the no-fault legislation is remedial and, hence, entitled to liberal construction. [Id. at 372 (citation omitted).]
We have also recognized that "the fact of payment has the capacity of taking the claim out of the basic two-year/four-year limitation of the statute altogether." Zupo v. CNA Ins. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 374, 380 (App. Div.), aff'd, 98 N.J. 30 (1984).
With these principles in mind, we address the meaning of "the last payment of
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