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Sawyer v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company11/20/2002
inst the party who caused it to be drafted. Here, it is undisputed that the State drafted the additional insured endorsement. The often-stated rule that ambiguous provisions are interpreted in favor of coverage does not apply where the insured requests particular language and the insurer agrees to include it. (Garcia v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1984) 36 Cal.3d 426, 438; Hartford v. State of California (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570.) Appellants cite to the recent California Supreme Court cases of Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 840 and Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 765 for the proposition that courts have "consistently resolved any ambiguity in favor of coverage and the reasonable expectations of the insured, regardless of which party drafted the contract language." But these cases do not go so far and do not deal with the situation where, as here, the ambiguous language was drafted by the insured.
The trial court rejected appellants' contention that since the State and driver Ahn Van Nguyen were each 50 percent negligent (as determined by Judge Fruin after stipulation between appellants and the State), then the State would not be "solely" negligent under the terms of exclusion (c). We agree with the trial court that such an interpretation would lead to absurd results because it would make coverage depend on matters outside the control of the insureds. St. Paul provides an appropriate example: If appellants' vehicle had hit a support post for an overpass because of the lack of lighting, the State would be the only negligent party. But, where as here, the obstruction was another vehicle disabled from a prior accident, under appellants' theory, the negligence of the driver would render the State no longer solely negligent, even though the basis of its liability (lack of lighting) is exactly the same. Courts do not find ambiguities on the basis of a strained interpretation leading to absurd results. (Bay Cities Paving & Grading v. Lawyers Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867-869.)
We also find appellant's interpretation unreasonable because the liability of Nguyen was based on negligent driving and not a lack of lighting. As St. Paul points out, the only parties ever alleged to have been liable for the lack of lighting were MCM and the State. Any negligence of Nguyen that may have contributed to the accident was for a wholly different cause unrelated to the construction contract and has no bearing on the determination of whether the State was solely negligent within the meaning of the policy endorsement issued pursuant to that contract.
We also note that Judge Fruin found Nguyen to be 50 percent liable following the November 5 and 6, 1997 court proceedings in which Nguyen did not participate and following a stipulation which did not involve Nguyen, but was between appellants and the State, that agreed that Nguyen was the "sole cause of the accident" that proceeded appellants' accident. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the parties' actions is that they were trying to avoid the "sole negligence" exclusion of the St. Paul policy. But, as discussed above, this finding of negligence on the part of the State was not based on an evidentiary showing in an independent adjudication of liability and was therefore not binding on St. Paul.
Appellants also claim that the "policy language of exclusion (c) specifically brought within coverage a claim of negligence by the State in supervising MCM personnel." The second part of exclusion (c) provides that there will be no coverage for bodily injury or to property damage arising "(2) out of any act or omission of the additional insured or any of its officers or employees, other than supe
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