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Mai v. Krause11/1/2002
juries, to make their conduct intentional or at least of such intentional nature as to justify exercise of jurisdiction, because of their knowledge that continued distribution of the ladder through Home Depot would lead to injuries in this state? The majority appears to trace this notice to the information about failure of a particular bolt. If I were a jury or a trial judge, I may and would find, after thorough review of the evidence and proper discovery related to jurisdiction, that the increase in injuries, in combination with the governmental notice, were sufficient knowledge of the dangerousness of this product to make continued distribution of it sufficiently intentional to lead these defendants to recognize they may be haled into court in this state, prior to notice of failure of the bolt. The necessary intent was to direct the dangerous instrumentality into this state with the intent to profit from its distribution with knowledge of its dangerous propensities, not the intent to injure.
2. How immediately were Hansen's actions when he heard of the bolt failure? Was it hours or days? There was a one-month delay in disseminating notice to consumers. The passage of days in the case of the present injury could have made a difference in whether this plaintiff received notice in time to avoid injury. More to the point, Hansen and Krause were privy to information at an earlier time that there were injuries increasing with the product.
3. The manner in which the majority distances Mr. Krause from the acts of the corporation does not appear to be justified. He was a 100 percent shareholder of the company, and a direct designer of the product. Jurisdiction was asserted over owners of 20 percent and 40 percent of stock in Chicago Blower Corp. v. Air Systems Associates, supra, 623 F.Supp. at pp. 801-804. Defendant Krause had a direct role here in the design of the instrumentality of plaintiff's injury , and Hansen in the failure to recall it.
The majority opinion effectively assumes the conclusion, also, that they were not alter egos for the corporation in the acts at issue. That conclusion should await trial. In fact, particularly with respect to manufacture of a dangerous ladder, the Supreme Court held, in Ray v. Alad Corp. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 22, that tort liability for injuries resulting from the ladder-even strict liability-can be transferred to the owners of the dissolved company's assets. Plaintiff's plea to bring in Mr. Hansen and Mr. Krause after Mr. Krause filed for bankruptcy during a trial in which the corporation had admitted liability for plaintiff's injuries is tantamount to an alter ego claim against them. Plaintiff was reduced to making the last-minute claim against Mr. Krause because of the bankruptcy. Reliance on legal niceties of due process should favor a plaintiff in such a situation since "fairness" in haling the defendants into court here is the underlying principle. If Mr. Krause or Mr. Hansen acted as the alter ego of a corporation, Krause, Inc., over which this state had conceded personal jurisdiction, that is a perfectly sound basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the individuals. (Sheard v. Superior Court (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 207, 210 [" here a corporation is the alter ego of the stockholders so as to justify disregard of the corporate entity jurisdiction over the corporation will support jurisdiction over the stockholders. [Citation.]"].)
"There are two requirements to the application of the alter ego doctrine. These are (1) that there be such a unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individuals no longer exist and (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an ineq
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