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Adams v. City and County of San Francisco11/8/2002
it argued the experts presented by Adams had failed to establish there was a reasonable probability that the accident had caused Adams's CM-I condition to become symptomatic. When the trial court rejected that argument, CCSF filed the present appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
CCSF contends the trial court erred when it denied its motion for a partial JNOV.
"The trial court's discretion in granting a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is severely limited." (Teitel v. First Los Angeles Bank (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603.) The motion may be granted only if the trial record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, fails to contain substantial evidence to support the verdict. (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs (2001) 25 Cal.4th 62, 68.) The trial court may not reweigh the evidence, draw inferences contrary to the verdict, or assess the credibility of the witnesses. (Begnal v. Canfield & Associates, Inc. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 66, 72.)
On appeal, the same standard of review applies. We must view the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the verdict. (Sweatman v. Department of Veterans Affairs, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 68.)
CCSF contends the trial court should have granted its motion for partial JNOV because the evidence Adams presented failed to establish that it was reasonably probable the accident caused her CM-I condition to become symptomatic.
"A plaintiff cannot recover damages based upon speculation or even a mere possibility that the wrongful conduct of the defendant caused the harm . . . . Evidence of causation must rise to the level of a reasonable probability based upon competent testimony." (Williams v. Wraxall (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 120, 133, internal citations omitted.) "A possible cause only becomes `probable' when, in the absence of other reasonable causal explanations, it becomes more likely than not that the injury was a result of its action." (Jones v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 396, 403.)
In this case, Adams presented testimony from two experts, who said the accident had caused her CM-I condition to become symptomatic. However, the parties focus their arguments primarily on Adams's second witness, Dr. Rubenstein. We will similarly limit our analysis.
Dr. Rubenstein had been a doctor for 27 years. He was board certified in neurology, and had been elected to fellowship in the American Academy of Neurology, a level of certification higher than board certification. Dr. Rubenstein had also written scholarly articles in the field of neurology.
Dr. Rubenstein testified unequivocally that the accident caused Adams's CM-I condition to become symptomatic. He explained, "My opinion is that the necessity for the surgery was precipitated by the MUNI bus collision that occurred on November [10, 1998.] [ ] . . . [ ] Absent that collision I believe that Miss Adams would have continued to remain asymptomatic, certainly in terms of her major symptoms of throat pain, swallowing difficulties, shoulder pain, left arm pain and numbness."
Dr. Rubenstein based his conclusion on several factors. First, in the course of his 27 years of practice, he personally was involved with two patients who had CM-I and who became symptomatic after a traumatic incident. Dr. Rubenstein also relied on many scholarly articles, two of which were of particular note. The first, by Dr. Thomas Mampalam et al., described a 13-year-old girl with CM-I who became symptomatic after she was hit by a car. Acco
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