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Fontana v. City and County of San Francisco10/30/2002
e, as a resident of Brazil, she was under no obligation to comply with the City's notice to appear at trial pursuant to section 1987. Section 1987, subdivision (b) provides in part that, in lieu of a subpoena, a party may serve written notice requesting the attendance at trial of a party witness, and that the notice shall have the same effect as a subpoena for attendance before the court. Section 1987, subdivision (c) provides that the notice may include a request that the party bring identified documents to the trial. Section 1987 is expressly made subject to the terms of section 1989, which provides: "A witness, including a witness specified in subdivision (b) of Section 1987, is not obliged to attend as a witness before any court, judge, justice or any other officer, unless the witness is a resident within the state at the time of service." (§ 1989.) A trial court has no jurisdiction to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness, even when that witness is a party. (Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 554, 559.) There is no dispute that Fontana was not a resident of California at the time of service of the notice. Thus, the City's notice to appear and bring documents was void, and the court could not dismiss her action because she failed to comply with it. (Ibid., citing Twin Lock, Inc. v. Superior Court (1959) 52 Cal.2d 754, 761-762.)
Despite the court's lack of discretion to dismiss on the grounds just discussed, we conclude the court acted within its discretion to dismiss the case under its inherent judicial power. It has long been recognized that courts have inherent power to control court business and to devise procedural means necessary to effectuate their jurisdiction. (Topa Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1344, citations omitted; Lorraine v. McComb (1934) 220 Cal. 753, 756; Millholen v. Riley (1930) 211 Cal. 29, 33-34; Sousa v. Capital Co. (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 744, 755.) A court's inherent discretionary power includes the authority to dismiss claims or actions. Thus, in addition to specific statutory bases for dismissal, section 581 provides: "The provisions of this section shall not be deemed to be an exclusive enumeration of the court's power to dismiss an action or dismiss a complaint as to a defendant." (§ 581, subd. (m).) Likewise, section 583.150 provides: "This chapter [governing dismissal for delay in prosecution] does not limit or affect the authority of a court to dismiss an action or impose other sanctions under a rule adopted by the court pursuant to Section 575.1 or by the Judicial Council pursuant to statute or otherwise under inherent authority of the court." (§ 583.150, emphasis added.)
To determine whether the trial court's dismissal of the action under its inherent authority was appropriate, we look to case law addressing the authority of the court to dismiss under inherent power. It has been observed, for example, that courts have inherent power over their proceedings and to enforce any order they make. (Sousa v. Capital Co., supra, 220 Cal.App.2d at p. 755.) In Sousa v. Capital Co., the trial court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend. (220 Cal.App.2d. at p. 747.) When plaintiffs failed to amend within the given time, the clerk entered plaintiffs' default without providing notice to plaintiffs, and the court dismissed the action. (Id. at pp. 747-748.) The appellate court concluded that, although the clerk was not authorized to enter plaintiffs' default in that situation, the court's dismissal of the action was proper. (Id. at p. 755.) " he court had the power to enforce its order by dismissing when plaintiffs did not, in effect, comply with the terms upon which the court gra
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