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Fontana v. City and County of San Francisco10/30/2002
s and would have continued doing so had the court granted another continuance. The court's dismissal without prejudice was a lesser sanction than dismissal with prejudice, and we need not strain to conceive of a possible sanction of still lesser severity that the court could have imposed to vindicate its authority. When Fontana invoked the power of the court to resolve her dispute with the City, "she agreed to abide by rules designed to facilitate the orderly and equitable resolution not only of her dispute, but also of the thousands of other cases pending before the court at the same time. The power of dismissal is the court's means of enforcing those rules, and it exists so the court can manage its own affairs and preserve respect for the integrity of its process." (Vernon v. Great Western Bank (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1013.) The trial court was not required to tolerate Fontana's pattern of obtaining court orders and failing to comply with them.
We reach Fontana's final argument on appeal because it provides an additional basis upon which we conclude the trial court's order of dismissal was proper. Fontana contends she was entitled to offer her deposition testimony in lieu of appearing and testifying at trial. In support of this contention, she cites section 2025, subdivision (u)(3)(A), which provides in part:
"At the trial or any other hearing in the action, any part or all of a deposition may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition . . . so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the deponent were then present and testifying as a witness, in accordance with the following provisions: [ ] . . . [ ] (A) The deponent resides more than 150 miles from the place of the trial or other hearing."
Her argument in its entirety states: "FONTANA was a resident of Brazil, the CITY noticed and took her deposition; therefore, in her absence, her deposition could have been used by FONTANA against the CITY in seeking to establish the necessary elements of her cause of action." In other words, Fontana resided more than 150 miles from the trial court and so automatically should have been entitled to use her deposition at trial without appearing in person as a witness.
Fontana is correct that section 2025 would authorize her use of her deposition at trial. However, this argument ignores the issue of whether the trial court's ruling excluding the otherwise admissible deposition was proper.
We conclude the exclusion of the deposition was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. It is well settled that trial courts have broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of evidence. (Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 272, 288, citation omitted (Peat, Marwick).) Trial courts also have inherent power to curb abuses and promote fair process, derived from the historic power of equity courts and the power of courts to supervise and carry out their duties. (Id. at p. 287.) It follows that this inherent power, which has been "recognized, endorsed and affirmed in a considerable body of authority," extends to the preclusion of evidence to ensure fundamental fairness. (Id. at pp. 287-288; see also Castaline v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 580, 592 (Castaline) [trial courts have "basic power to insure that all parties receive a fair trial" by excluding evidence].)
In Peat, Marwick, an accounting malpractice action, the trial court precluded defendant accounting firm from controverting evidence on certain allegations after the defendant merged with the accounting firm retained by plaintiff as its expert. (Peat, Marwick, supra, 200 Cal.App.3d at
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