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White v. Progressive Mountain Insurance Company11/21/2002
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Ney and Kapelke, JJ., concur
Plaintiff, Thomas Chris White, appeals the judgment entered in favor of defendant, Progressive Mountain Insurance Company. We affirm.
On March 5, 1994, plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiff was insured by an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant that included coverage required by the version of Colorado Auto Accident Reparations Act, § 10-4-701, et seq., C.R.S. 2002, in effect at that time. In January 1999, plaintiff's doctors determined that, as a result of his injuries, plaintiff would require vocational rehabilitation. Plaintiff underwent a vocational rehabilitation assessment and received a plan to begin rehabilitation services in June 1999. On March 4, 1999, plaintiff contacted defendant and demanded payment for the rehabilitation services. Defendant advised plaintiff that benefits for such services were beyond the five-year limitation period in the policy and denied plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant for breach of contract and bad faith breach of contract. Defendant moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted defendant's motion after a hearing and entered judgment in favor of defendant. This appeal followed.
I.
Plaintiff contends that the provision in his policy limiting rehabilitation benefits to a period of five years after an accident is inconsistent with the version of § 10-4-706(1)(c) in effect at the time. Plaintiff argues that the trial court misapplied the statute and erred as a matter of law in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, or admissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Appellate review of a summary judgment is de novo. C.R.C.P. 56; De La Rosa v. Western Funding, Inc., 24 P.3d 637 (Colo. App. 2001).
In determining the meaning of statutory provisions, our objective is to give full effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In doing so, we must first consider the statutory language. If the legislative intent is immediately apparent from the commonly understood and accepted meaning of the statutory language, we need look no further and must give effect to the statute as written. However, if the statutory language is ambiguous, we must consider principles of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent. In such a case, we may consider the textual context, the statute's legislative history, the state of the law prior to the legislative enactment, the problem addressed by the legislation, and the relationship between the particular legislation and other relevant legislative provisions. Colby v. Progressive Casualty Ins. Co., 928 P.2d 1298 (Colo. 1996)(Colby II).
The version of § 10-4-706(1)(c)(I)(A) in effect at the time of the accident required an insurer to provide certain minimum coverage in automobile insurance policies for payment of the cost of rehabilitation services incurred as a result of injury arising out of the use or operation of a motor vehicle. Colo. Sess. Laws 1973, ch. 94, § 13-25-6(1) & (4)(a)(I) at 335-36 (now codified with amendments as § 10-4-706(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2002). The version of § 10-4-706(1)(c)(II) (the rehabilitation section) then in effect provided:
An insurer obligated to provide direct benefits under this section shall be presumed to have complied with the provision for rehabilitation when the value of rehabilitation services or treatment provided under paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this secti
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