 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Dowsett v. Morris11/29/2002
ary judgment may only rely on facts which are before the court as provided in Rule 56, H.R.C.P. Unverified statements of fact in counsel's memorandum or representations made in oral argument cannot be considered in determining a motion for summary judgment." (Citations omitted.)). Its assertions and arguments would have to be otherwise verified, in accordance with HRCP Rule 56.
But such verification could not come from the supplemental exhibits, because they were not properly before the court on the motion for summary judgment. The supplemental exhibits were hearsay, HRE Rules 801 & 802 (1993), and were not properly authenticated by the declaration of Dowsett's attorney, Pioneer Mill, 90 Hawaii at 297, 978 P.2d at 735 ("an affidavit of counsel swearing to the truth and accuracy of exhibits does not authenticate exhibits not sworn to or uncertified by the preparer or custodian of those exhibits" (citation omitted)), and were therefore inadmissible on the motion for summary judgment.
We are left, then, with Dowsett's affidavit. But it was no help to Dowsett. The quotation from Dr. Chow's "Initial Report" contained in the affidavit was inadmissible hearsay, HRE Rules 801 & 802, and its substance, in any event, shed no light on the issues pertinent to this case. The balance of Dowsett's affidavit was similarly irrelevant. Dowsett described her April 1993 motor vehicle accident and detailed certain of her current physical symptoms and disabilities, but never related the two. Dowsett mentioned her October 1999 work injury , but did not allege that it aggravated previous injuries such that associated expenses should be apportionable to the motor vehicle accident. In addition, nowhere in the affidavit did Dowsett aver that the motor vehicle accident caused permanent loss, or attributable expenses above and beyond those she detailed in her interrogatory answers. With respect to the various medical-rehabilitative expenses indicated in Exhibit 1, Dowsett did not depose that those expenses were related to the motor vehicle accident, and nothing in Exhibit 1 shows that they were.
At bottom, Dowsett presented no evidence to rebut her own admissions, that showed she did not fit within any of the exceptions to the abolition of tort liability in motor vehicle accident cases. We therefore conclude that the court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
III. Conclusion.
We therefore affirm the August 29, 2000 judgment, the July 28, 2000 order granting Morris's motion for summary judgment, the July 28, 2000 order denying Dowsett's motion to continue the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the August 29, 2000 order denying Dowsett's motion for reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment, the October 30, 2000 order granting Morris's motion for attorney's fees and costs, and the October 31, 2000 amended judgment.
|