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Thayer v. State11/14/2002
University's motion for summary judgment. Under our rule, the thirty-day period expired on November 2, 2001. Thayer served notice of appeal on opposing counsel on October 30, 2001. Thayer also sent notice of appeal to the district court clerk and the Supreme Court clerk on that date. All but the district court clerk received the notices. On November 29, 2001, the district court informed Thayer it did not have a notice of appeal on record. Thayer filed her notice of appeal with the district court on December 5, 2001.
Thayer served timely notice of appeal on all concerned parties but she did not file with the district court clerk until thirty-five days after Thayer served notice of appeal on opposing counsel. Thirty-two days lapsed in between when notice was due to be filed and when Thayer filed her notice with the district court. Because Thayer filed notice of appeal with the district court thirty-two days after it was due, she did not comply with the rules of filing. If, however, Thayer filed the notice "within a reasonable time" after it was served, the time for filing was tolled and she complied with Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(4). The question is whether the delay in this case was reasonable.
In Cook v. City of Council Bluffs, 264 N.W.2d 784 (Iowa 1978), we stated that where a party filed a notice of appeal with the district court clerk twenty-six days after service was due, the service was reasonable because the notice was initially mailed in a timely fashion, but the mail service went awry. We have defined a "reasonable time" as
such time as is necessary, under the circumstances, for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be done, having regard for the rights, and possibly the loss if any to the other party affected. . . . Cook, 264 N.W.2d at 787 (quoting Williamson Heater Co. v. Whitmer, 191 Iowa 1115, 1119, 183 N.W.2d 404, 405 (1921)).
The facts before us are strikingly similar to those in Cook. Thayer sent notice of appeal in a timely manner to the district court clerk, but, for some reason, the notice did not arrive. Thayer missed the thirty-day filing deadline imposed by our rules of appellate procedure. Her delay was reasonable however-Thayer's filing was only thirty-two days after the deadline was tolled. Because both the University and the Supreme Court clerk received notice of the appeal in a timely fashion, we find no unfairness to the University. In Cook we found twenty-six days was a reasonable time to file after service. Similarly, under the circumstances of the case before us, thirty-two days was a reasonable time to file the notice of appeal after service on the parties.
B. Workers' Compensation as an Exclusive Remedy
Iowa Code section 85.20 does not bar a negligence suit against an employer unless the action arose while the employee was acting within the scope of her employment and the injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. See Iowa Code § 85.20 (1997). The University contends Thayer's injuries arose out of and in the course of her employment such that workers' compensation benefits are her exclusive remedy. Thayer contends she was merely going to work and is not covered by workers' compensation.
Chapter 85 provides a "zone of protection" in workers' compensation making an employer responsible for workers' compensation benefits only for "any and all personal injuries sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of employment. . . ." Id. § 85.3(1); Waterhouse Water Conditioning, Inc. v. Waterhouse, 561 N.W.2d 55, 57 (Iowa 1997); Frost v. S.S. Kresge Co., 299 N.W.2d 646, 648 (Iowa 1980). In general, an injured e
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