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Kluin v. American Suzuki Motor Corporation11/1/2002
der the employee dishonesty provisions of its business policy. The policy was issued through State Farm's office in Nebraska. The Three Ten court said: "While pointing out that State Farm does transact business in Kansas, Three Ten makes no claim that its cause of action arises out of State Farm's Kansas business activities." 24 Kan. App. 2d at 88. Three Ten continued: "The fact that 60-308(b) is to be liberally construed does not mean that the courts are to ignore the statutory requirement that the cause of action arise from the defendant's doing of one or more of the enumerated acts in this state." 24 Kan. App. 2d at 91. We agree.
Kluin's claims did not arise out of alleged contacts with dealerships in Kansas. Kluin purchased the motorcycle from Bartlesville Cycle Sports in Oklahoma. The warranty repairs referenced in Kluin's petition were performed by Bartlesville Cycle Sports in Oklahoma.
The district judge here, in finding a lack of personal jurisdiction over Suzuki, relied on Solomon v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 1989 WL 106823 (D. Kan 1989.) (Solomon I), saying in his memorandum ruling: "Another Kansas court has previously addressed this issue and determined that Suzuki was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Kansas."
Solomon was a Kansas resident. While in Aruba to attend a business meeting, he leased a Suzuki Samurai from Marco's Car Rental, which in turn allegedly purchased rental cars from Carib Motors, an Aruban business engaged in the distribution of vehicles purchased in Florida. Solomon's complaint filed in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas alleged that the Samurai was defective, that he suffered personal injury when the car overturned in Aruba, and that Suzuki was transacting business in Kansas. Solomon I found that Suzuki's conduct did not provide a basis for jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(1). Solomon I noted that "there must be some causal connection between the enumerated act under the long-arm statute and plaintiff's cause of action such that but for defendant's transaction of business in Kansas, plaintiff's injuries would not have occurred." 1989 WL 106823, at * 2. Solomon's injuries arose from an accident in Aruba. The court found that Solomon failed to allege a causal connection between any business activity Suzuki may or may not have conducted in Kansas and his injuries. 1989 WL 106823, at * 2.
Later, in Solomon v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 1990 WL 11114 (D. Kan. 1990) (Solomon II), Suzuki moved for sanctions against Solomon and his counsel. Solomon had asserted in Solomon I, as Kluin does here, that personal jurisdiction was based upon his Kansas residence and because his "decision to rent the Suzuki was prompted by plaintiff's exposure to advertisements for the Suzuki Samurai while in Kansas." 1990 WL 11114, at * 1.
Although the district judge here discussed Solomon I at length in his memorandum decision, Kluin does not mention the case in his brief on appeal.
The facts here do not support personal jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(1).
K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) and The Kansas Consumer Protection Act
Kluin also claims personal jurisdiction over Suzuki under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2), which provides for jurisdiction based upon the "commission of a tortious act within this state."
Kluin asserts that the commission of a "tortious act" under K.S.A. 60-308(b)(2) would include a violation of the KCPA.
K.S.A. 50-638(a) says:
"Any supplier, whether or not a resident or citizen of this state, who in person or through an agent or an instrumentality, engages in a consumer transaction in this state, thereby submits the supplie
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