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State v. O'Hanlan11/5/2002
hat isolated expressions, standing alone, might be considered erroneous affords no grounds for reversal.'" Id. at 125, 310 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting State v. Jones, 294 N.C. 642, 653, 243 S.E.2d 118, 125 (1978)).
Applying the foregoing principles to the instant case, we hold that, although "serious personal injury " was omitted once, when the entire jury charge is viewed contextually, it reveals no plain error as the instructional error had no impact on the jury's finding of guilt. Defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
IV.
In his final assignment of error, defendant contends that his convictions should be vacated as a result of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Defendant argues that his trial counsel failed on numerous occasions to object to repeated opinion testimony from Dr. Hanaway, Dr. Lichtig, and Chief Detective Fortner. In addition, defendant asserts that his trial counsel performed unreasonably when he failed to object to the trial court's mandate to the jury that it find first-degree rape upon proof of "personal injury ," instead of "serious personal injury ." Defendant argues that but for these errors, defendant would have obtained a different result at trial.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish (1) that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the defendant was prejudiced by his attorney's performance to the extent there exists a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different absent the error. State v. Skipper, 146 N.C. App. 532, 537-38, 553 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2001); State v. Jaynes, 353 N.C. 534, 547-48, 549 S.E.2d 179, 191 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 152 L. Ed. 2d 220 (2002); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). Defendant has not satisfied either prong of this test.
In the present case, defendant has failed to prove the attorney's performance fell below the objective standard of reasonableness or to show that his error was such that the result of defendant's trial would have been different. In light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt, the failure to object in certain instances would not make it more probable that the outcome of trial would have been different as the testimony complained of was at most harmless error and the jury instructions as a whole were correct. Defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
Because we find that defendant had a fair trial free from prejudicial error, we find
No error.
Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
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