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Alder v. Bayer Corp.11/26/2002
e among recognized diagnoses in this respect. For example, as Dr. Cullen testified, until quite recently multiple sclerosis could only be diagnosed symptomatically. In the absence of modern medical imaging techniques, multiple sclerosis' savage demyelination of nerve tissue proceeded unseen behind the puzzling array of observable symptoms. Nonetheless, mere invisibility did not render the destruction unreal. Human ignorance is no deterrent to the wonders--and horrors--of nature. Therefore, although proof must "be more than merely subjective," Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71 (Utah 1998), we will not place impossible obstacles in the way of plaintiffs' attempts to prove objective damages.
We hold that the district court committed factual error in grouping all related symptoms and conditions together under the heading of MCS. We reemphasize that fibromyalgia, CFS, and cognitive deficits are all accepted diagnoses and that the record contains sufficient evidence of these diagnoses to raise an issue of triable fact. Therefore, we reverse the district court's holding that Technicians have failed to show legally cognizable injury.
IV. ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Legal Tests of Admissibility Under Rule 702 and Rimmasch
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 establishes the general standard for admissibility of expert testimony, providing that
f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. Utah R. Evid. 702.
In Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), we further elaborated "the standard by which the admissibility of expert scientific testimony is to be judged." Id. at 399. Such a standard is necessary because science in the court is a two-edged sword. While often helpful, scientific testimony also has the potential to overawe and confuse, and even to be misused for that purpose. Consequently, jurisprudential history reveals a consistent attempt to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence while allowing a maximum of relevant information to flow to the finder of fact.
In Rimmasch, we rejected exclusive use of the general acceptance test set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396-99. Instead, we adopted the reasoning of Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), approving inherent reliability rather than general acceptance as "the touchstone of admissibility." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396. Although "'a showing of general acceptance would generally be sufficient' to show inherent reliability and to justify the admission of scientific evidence," general acceptance was no longer the "sine qua non of admission." Id. at 396-97 (quoting Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234). In the absence of general acceptance, other proofs of reliability could also suffice. We expressed confidence that "the more flexible test articulated in Phillips seems fully capable of performing the necessary screening function without unduly impeding the flow of reliable scientific evidence to the fact finder." Id. at 397 n.6.
Rimmasch also set the limits of its own application. Historically, "where expert testimony is based upon novel scientific principles or techniques, courts have long imposed additional tests of admissibility" beyond the standard rules of evidence. Id. at 396 (emphasis added). Thus, "' owever the test is formulated . . . a foundation establishing the reliability of new scientific evidence must be established for it to be adm
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