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Harding v. Bell11/5/2002
ttack. An angiogram performed the following morning disclosed that she had a coronary artery condition. Dr. Douglas Smith then performed a successful angioplasty.
On December 10, 1997, Harding filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. Bell, alleging that he breached numerous duties of care. During voir dire, Harding asserted that prospective jurors 7, 11, and 12 should be excused for cause due to probable bias. The trial court disagreed, and Harding used her peremptory challenges to remove the three individuals.
A six-day trial followed, and the empaneled jury returned a special verdict on March 15, 2000. The jury concluded that both Dr. Bell and Harding had been negligent. It then apportioned their comparative fault, attributing 45% of the negligence to Dr. Bell and 55% to Harding.
Harding appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. ยง 78-2-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2002). On appeal, Harding claims that the trial court erred in not excusing prospective jurors 7, 11, and 12 for cause. Additionally, she contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that she was comparatively negligent.
ANALYSIS
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A "trial court's determination of whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause should not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Wach, 2001 UT 35, 25, 24 P.3d 948. A jury verdict should not be reversed due to insufficient evidence unless the evidence presented at trial is so lacking that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion that the jury reached. State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 74, 28 P.3d 1278.
II. FAILURE TO DISMISS PROSPECTIVE JURORS FOR CAUSE
We first examine whether the trial court erred in failing to excuse three prospective jurors for cause. Harding argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in refusing to strike prospective jurors 7, 11, and 12 because they exhibited "probable bias" during voir dire. In particular, Harding contends that (1) prospective juror number 7 should have been excused for cause because she stated that she knew Dr. Bell and his family and declared that she could "not guarantee" that she would be comfortable in rendering a decision, (2) prospective juror 11 should have been excused for cause because she was the second cousin of one of Dr. Bell's experts and stated that she might favor her cousin's testimony, and (3) prospective juror 12 should have been excused for cause because she was the best friend of a patient of Dr. Bell's and declared that her best friend liked Dr. Bell as a physician. Harding further contends that she was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to excuse these prospective jurors because, as a result of the cumulative effect of the trial court's errors, she was forced to use her peremptory challenges to remove the prospective jurors, and some of the individuals that ended up sitting on the jury had very "conservative" views.
To ascertain whether a new trial is warranted for failure to dismiss a prospective juror for cause, we apply a two-part test. Wach, 2001 UT 35 at 24. First, we consider whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in failing to excuse the prospective juror for cause. Id. Second, we assess whether the trial court's failure to strike the prospective juror actually prejudiced the party seeking a new trial. Id.
Here, even assuming that the trial court exceeded its discretion in not excusing prospective jurors 7, 11, or 12, Harding has failed to establish that she was actually prejudiced by the trial court's rulings. Indeed, although she proffers several grounds on which she was prejudiced, she has fa
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