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Jensen v. McPherson11/13/2002
tem. Stierman agreed. Consequently, on May 3, 2001, the court appointed Stierman as Erik's guardian ad litem.
. In May 2001, Stierman initiated a medical malpractice action on behalf of Erik (Jensen v. McPherson, No. 01-CV-00411). In July 2001, McPherson filed motions to dismiss the action on grounds that another action was pending in Walworth county (No. 97-CV-00704) between the same parties for the same cause pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.06(2)(a)10. In August 2001, Stierman filed a motion to consolidate the 1997 action with the 2001 action. On October 16, 2001, the circuit court denied McPherson's motion to dismiss Erik's 2001 action and granted Erik's motion to consolidate the 2001 action with the 1997 action. The court then determined that a new scheduling order would be set in due course. McPherson appeals.
. There are four issues in this leave to appeal: (1) should Erik be considered a party-plaintiff of the 1997 action; (2) was it necessary for Erik-if a party-to be represented by a guardian and was Erik in fact represented by a guardian; (3) did the circuit court err in reopening the scheduling order for the guardian ad litem after the mistrial was declared; and (4) should the order be reversed for public policy reasons.
. This case involves the interpretation of a statute, a question of law which we review de novo. See Agnes T. v. Milwaukee County, 189 Wis. 2d 520, 525, 525 N.W.2d 268 (1995). In interpreting a statute, we must seek to effectuate the intent of the legislature. State v. Olson, 175 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 498 N.W.2d 661 (1993). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, however, "we will not look beyond the language of the statute in applying it." State v. Swatek, 178 Wis. 2d 1, 5, 502 N.W.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1993).
. Additionally, we are charged with reviewing a decision of the circuit court to send out a new scheduling order. The decision of whether a scheduling order will be modified is within the circuit court's discretion, and its decision will only be reversed for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Alexander v. Riegert, 141 Wis. 2d 294, 298, 414 N.W.2d 636 (1987).
. We begin by identifying two basic principles, which we bear in mind as we proceed with our analysis. First, it is well settled that there are two separate causes of action when a minor is injured-the minor's and the minor's parents. Korth v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 115 Wis. 2d 326, 330, 340 N.W.2d 494 (1983). The minor's cause of action for physical injury and the parents' causes of action for the invasion of the parents' interests are separate in the sense that each is predicated upon the invasion of different interests of different persons. Id. at 331.
. The second basic principle we underscore is that a minor's cause of action is a property right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brandt v. Brandt, 161 Wis. 2d 784, 789, 468 N.W.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1991). Before a minor's property right is destroyed or adversely affected, he or she is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard. In addition, Wis. Stat. § 803.01(3)(a) reflects the general policy that "minors are the special objects of the solicitude of the courts and of government generally." Brandt, 161 Wis. 2d at 788 (citation omitted). The minor "is always the ward of every court wherein his [or her] rights or property are brought in jeopardy, and is entitled to most jealous care that no injustice be done him [or her]." Id. at 788-89 (citation omitted). Due process is satisfied only if notice is given to the person who has the duty of "jealous care" of the minor's rights. See id. at 789. Moreover, § 803.01(3)(c)2 emphasizes the legislative intent that minors are
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