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Condon v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Company11/5/2002
citations omitted).
Thus, even though the jury's verdict could be challenged by contradictory evidence, it is this court's obligation to search for credible evidence that will sustain the verdict, not for evidence to sustain a verdict the jury could have, but did not reach. See Meurer v. ITT Gen. Controls, 90 Wis. 2d 438, 450-51, 280 N.W.2d 156 (1979). "These standards apply not only as to the presence of negligence but also as to the existence of causation." City of Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 560, 564, 148 N.W.2d 13 (1967). In the instant case, credible evidence fairly supports the jury's finding.
. "Excessive speed certainly is causal when it prevents or retards the operator, after seeing danger, from slowing down or stopping in time to avoid a collision." Heagney v. Sellen, 272 Wis. 107, 112, 74 N.W.2d 745 (1956). Here, Officer Riederer testified that Fueger was traveling at approximately thirty-one to thirty-seven miles per hour at the time of the accident in an area where the speed limit was twenty-five miles per hour. Officer Riederer further testified that a vehicle traveling at twenty-five miles per hour (the speed limit) has a stopping distance of sixty-one feet, but that a vehicle traveling between thirty and forty miles per hour (Fueger's speed) has a stopping distance of seventy-nine to one-hundred and twenty-six feet. Finally Officer Riederer testified that a vehicle traveling between thirty-one and thirty-seven miles per hour would have been between 65.8 and 78.6 feet away from the collision point at 1.4 seconds prior to impact, and that a vehicle traveling at the same speed would have been between 131.7 and 157.2 feet from the collision point at 2.9 seconds prior to impact.
. We conclude that, based on this testimony, a reasonable juror could have concluded: (1) Ashley was riding her bicycle at ten miles per hour down the driveway; (2) Ashley was visible to Fueger for 1.4 seconds; (3) Fueger was traveling at thirty-one miles per hour at the time of the accident; (4) Fueger was 65.8 feet away from the accident at 1.4 seconds prior to impact; (5) the stopping distance at Fueger's speed was seventy-nine feet; but that (6) the stopping distance for a vehicle traveling at the speed limit is sixty-one feet. Thus, under this scenario, a reasonable juror could have concluded that, had Fueger been traveling at the speed limit, he would have been able to stop his vehicle in time to avoid the accident.
. Additionally, Fueger's speed could have had a direct effect on other types of negligence, including improper lookout:
Excessive speed has a direct effect upon other types of negligence. For instance, speed may limit the lookout of the operator or his ability to slow down or stop in time to avoid a collision. It is erroneous to state that excessive speed may not be causal because other items of negligence may or may not also be present. The causality of speed does not drop out of a case because there may also exist negligence in other respects, nor does it cease to exist necessarily because other items of negligence do not exist. Rodenkirch v. Johnson, 9 Wis. 2d 245, 252, 101 N.W.2d 83 (1960).
. Based on the testimony of Officer Riederer, a reasonable juror could have also drawn the following conclusions regarding the accident: (1) Ashley was traveling down the driveway at a speed of five miles per hour; (2) Ashley was visible to Fueger for 2.9 seconds; (3) Fueger was traveling at thirty-one miles per hour; (4) Fueger was 131.7 feet from the collision point at 2.9 seconds prior to impact; (5) the stopping distance for a vehicle traveling at Fueger's speed was seventy-nine feet; but that (6
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