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Condon v. Heritage Mutual Insurance Company11/5/2002
) Fueger's speed, in combination with the distraction of the loud radio, limited his ability to maintain a proper lookout. Thus, a reasonable juror could have also concluded that had Fueger been keeping a proper lookout, he could have seen Ashley in time to safely stop his vehicle and avoid the accident.
. Under either scenario, we conclude that sufficient credible evidence allowed the jury to reasonably infer that Fueger was causally negligent as to speed and lookout.
B. Expert testimony was not necessary to establish causation.
. Heritage also contends that the Condons were required to produce an independent expert witness on the issues of causation. Generally, however, it is not essential to have expert testimony on the issue of causation unless the issue involves technical, scientific, or medical matters beyond the common knowledge and experience of jurors. City of Cedarburg Light & Water Comm'n v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 560, 568a, 149 N.W.2d 661 (1967). Whether expert testimony is required must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Netzel v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 51 Wis. 2d 1, 6, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971).
. Here, we conclude that the issues involved - speed and lookout - do not involve scientific matters beyond the common knowledge and experience of jurors. As illustrated above, the jury could have readily based its finding of causation on the testimony of Officer Riederer regarding speed and stopping distance, as well as Fueger's testimony that he never saw Ashley before impact. Because the jury was able to draw its own conclusions without assistance of expert opinion, admission of such testimony would not only have been unnecessary, but also improper. See Valiga v. Nat'l Food Co., 58 Wis. 2d 232, 251, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973) ("If the court or jury is able to draw its own conclusions without assistance of expert opinion, admission of such testimony is not only unnecessary but improper."). Further, requiring expert testimony in cases involving such relatively simple automobile accidents would present an unnecessary financial hurdle to plaintiff's seeking access to our legal system. See Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, , 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698 ("Requiring specialized expert testimony ... in relatively simple automobile accident situations would escalate the cost of presenting personal injury cases without adequate justification. In short, it would present a serious issue in the administration of the legal system.").
C. Any error in admitting the testimony of Officer Riederer regarding the statistical relationship between impact speed and the severity of injury was harmless.
. At trial, Officer Riederer also testified regarding the statistical relationship between impact speed and the severity of injury :
[Plaintiff's Counsel]: Officer, are you familiar with authoritative sources that indicate what the relationship of speed is to fatalities in accidents?
....
[Officer Riederer]: Yes, I read a number of books that state the statistics.
....
[Plaintiff's Counsel]: And what is your recollection did those studies show, Officer?
....
[Officer Riederer]: According to the book, most fatal accidents occur between 26 and 30 miles an hour....
[Plaintiff's Counsel]: And what is the percentage of fatalities for accidents between 26 and 30 miles an hour?
[Officer Riederer]: 56 percent.
[Plaintiff's Counsel]: And what is the percentage of fatalities for accidents occurring at a speed of under 25?
[Officer Riederer]: 13 percent.
On cross-examinat
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