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Slutzki v. Grabenstetter9/25/2002
Dr. Grabenstetter caused emotional injury to Rina.
The case was submitted to the jury on special verdicts. The jury was first asked whether Dr. Grabenstetter was at fault, and was instructed that if its answer was "no" it was not to answer any further questions. It answered the first question "no" and did not reach the second question, whether fault of Dr. Grabenstetter was a proximate cause of the damages to Rina.
A trial court error is not reversible unless the error was prejudicial. See Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 612 (admission of evidence); McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 235 (same); Iowa-Illinois Gas and Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 828 (Iowa 1993) (jury instruction). Reversal is not required if the record shows a lack of prejudice. Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 612; McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 235; Shawhan v. Polk Co., 420 N.W.2d 808, 810 (Iowa 1988). We assume the jury heeded and complied with the instructions given by the trial court. Iowa-Illinois, 497 N.W.2d at 828.
We need not decide whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Taylor's testimony because any error in allowing the testimony was not prejudicial to the Slutzkis. An improper ruling on evidence offered to prove damages is not reversible error when the jury finds in favor of the defendant on liability (and thus does not reach the question of damages). See Shawhan, 420 N.W.2d at 810-11 (and cases cited therein). Similarly, error if any in allowing Dr. Taylor's testimony concerning whether Rina suffered from depression, and, if so, whether the depression was proximately caused by her hysterectomy and ensuing complications was not prejudicial because the jury found in favor of Dr. Grabenstetter on fault and did not reach the questions addressed by Dr. Taylor's testimony, existence and proximate causation of depression. Because the record shows that no prejudice could have resulted from the alleged error in admission of Dr. Taylor's testimony, no reversible error appears.
V. CONCLUSION.
We conclude the trial court did not err in refusing to submit to the jury the Slutzkis' claim of lack of informed consent, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow evidence of Dr. Grabenstetter's counterclaim. Without deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Dr. Taylor's testimony, we conclude the asserted error was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs and does not warrant reversal.
AFFIRMED.
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