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Kava v. American Honda Motor Co.6/14/2002
mistrial on the negligence claim. Upon receiving the foreperson's note that the jury had debated for eight hours and failed to reach a verdict on the negligence issue, the trial judge stated: "I think the indication, they spent eight hours at it and there has been no change . . . ustifies a finding that, as to the issue of the negligence claim, there is a mistrial." In response to concerns by Honda's trial counsel, the court later expressly confirmed that it had issued the mistrial order by "motion of the court." Because the judge declared the mistrial without a motion from either party, we believe that the finding of a mistrial can only be characterized as sua sponte.
We reject Honda's assertion that the estate waived its right to a retrial on the negligence cause of action by supporting the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial on that action. The estate did acknowledge that the jury appeared to be deadlocked on the negligence claim at that point; but it declined to move for a mistrial or to adopt the position that it would relinquish its right to seek a retrial on the mistried negligence claim. While it may be true that the trial court could have required the estate to elect between a mistrial on all issues and a waiver of its negligence cause of action, the court did not require such an election. Instead, it simply opted to declare a mistrial sua sponte. Given these circumstances, we hold that the estate's actions cannot properly be construed as a waiver of the right to a retrial.
This conclusion leads us to a slightly more vexing question: whether the trial court's sua sponte mistrial order entitles the estate to retry its negligence claim. As Honda correctly observes, the special verdict form for the products liability and negligence causes of action listed identical categories of damages for both claims, and the jury's verdict on the products liability cause of action assessed the damages that the jury found appropriate in each category. The question, then, is whether, under the evidence presented, the estate realistically might have recovered any additional award for the same categories of damages had the jury not deadlocked on the negligence cause of action.
The estate's dual claims for negligence and products liability were independent causes of action in the sense that they were sufficiently distinct and separable to stand alone. Yet most of their shared categories of damages were obviously coextensive. For example, the damages for "past loss of support and services" and "future loss of support, services and inheritance" would be identical regardless of the theory under which they were awarded. Because these damages have already been decided by the jury in the products liability verdict, it would be an injustice to subject Honda to the expenses and risks of redetermining those damages in a retrial.
Similarly, the issue of punitive damages was essentially identical for both causes of action; on each claim, the jury was required to determine whether Honda's conduct was outrageous and would therefore support punitive damages. The special verdict form contained a single question relating to both claims on punitive damages: "Have plaintiffs proven by clear and convincing evidence that Honda engaged in outrageous conduct? (Answer yes or no)." The jury answered this question in the negative. Neither the jury instructions nor the evidence at trial differentiated between the kinds of conduct that would be outrageous under the estate's theories of negligence and products liability. Given these circumstances, the jury's finding that Honda had not engaged in outrageous conduct must be deemed to preclude an award of punitive damages under both causes of action.
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