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Kava v. American Honda Motor Co.6/14/2002
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As to all issues of compensatory and punitive damages, then, because retrying the negligence theory would merely allow the estate to relitigate issues that the first jury has already considered and fully decided, we conclude that no retrial is warranted. But one point remains to be considered: comparative fault. As to this point, we find it possible that a retrial on the estate's negligence theory could lead to a different result based on a new jury's consideration of factual issues that the original jury's verdict on products liability does not fully resolve.
Because a finding of comparative relative fault requires the jury to allocate relative degrees of fault among joint wrongdoers, there is good reason to believe that if the original jurors had found Honda liable on the basis of actual negligence rather than strict products liability, they would have assessed greater comparative fault to Honda than they did when they allocated fifty percent fault to Gologergen in response to special verdict question 15. We thus conclude that a new trial will be necessary on the issue of comparative fault unless Honda agrees upon remand to accept full liability for the damages awarded by the original jury.
D. The Motion for a New Trial.
The estate next argues that the trial court applied the wrong standard when it denied the estate's motion for a new trial. The estate claims that instead of viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Honda, the trial judge should have determined the weight and credibility of the evidence for himself and decided whether the jury's verdict was "against the weight of the evidence." The estate is correct.
The standard for deciding a motion for a directed verdict or for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict requires a trial court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. By contrast, a trial court may set aside a verdict and order a new trial in the interest of justice if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In deciding a motion for a new trial on this basis, the court must use its discretion and independently weigh the evidence. A court may set aside a verdict as being against the weight of the evidence even when "there is substantial evidence to support it." The decision is a matter for the trial court's discretion.
In the present case, the estate moved for a new trial, not for a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court's order denying the estate's motion for a new trial shows that it applied the directed verdict standard. The trial court cited Mallonee v. Finch in support of the proposition that, " n deciding the motion [for a new trial], this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict." But, the trial court's citation to Mallonee refers to the portion of that opinion dealing with the appellate standard of review, not the standard to be applied by the trial court ruling on a motion for a new trial in the interest of justice.
As we explained in Mallonee, " nlike a motion for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v., [the motion for new trial] involves the trial judge's discretion." By moving for a new trial, and not just for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the estate sought a discretionary ruling from the court based on its personal view of the evidence. Although the estate bolstered its argument with the claim that the jury's verdict was flawed as a matter of law, this argument did not deprive it of the right to a decision based on the trial court's independent discretion. The trial court applied
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