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Healthone v. Rodriguez6/24/2002
as appropriately resolved at the first trial. See, e.g., Scott v. Matsuda, 127 Colo. 267, 255 P.2d 403 (1953) (recognizing that the court could grant a new trial on the issue of negligence alone, leaving the amount of damages as established by the verdict); Boyle v. Bay, 81 Colo. 125, 254 P. 156 (1927)(remanding on sole question of liability with amount of damages standing as established). However, we do not believe that such a resolution is proper in this case. Ogin was dismissed from the first trial and was thus not a party to the action. Although Ogin does not expressly object to capping the damage award, he does suggest that such a resolution would be inconsistent with our holding that Rodriguez did not accept the benefit of the judgment. Specifically, Ogin argues that binding him to the total amount of damages awarded in the first trial demonstrates that the judgment entered against HealthONE is inseparable from Rodriguez's claim against him. Thus, because the judgment against HealthONE and the claim against Ogin are so closely connected, Rodriguez cannot accept the benefit of one and appeal the other.
In view of Ogin's argument, we can not infer that Ogin has agreed to be bound by the total amount of damages awarded by the jury in the first trial. Absent such an agreement, we find no legal doctrine that would allow us to bind him to a prior adjudication in which he did not participate in the earlier proceeding. Therefore, at the new trial with Ogin as the sole defendant, Barton and HealthONE shall be named non-parties and treated as having settled the case before retrial. The jury, in determining Ogin's percentage of fault, shall also determine Barton's and HealthONE's percentages of fault. ยง 13-21-111.5(3), 5 C.R.S. (2001). Ogin's fault and the total amount of damages awarded to Rodriguez should be calculated independently of the jury's previous award and allocation of fault. Regardless of the jury award and the reallocation of fault at the second trial, the damages awarded against HealthONE shall remain the same and, of course, the settlement with Barton shall not be affected.
III. HealthONE's Claims
HealthONE first argues that Rodriguez lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the incapacitated person provision. Because we find that Rodriguez has standing, we then consider the constitutionality of the incapacitated person provision. We find that the incapacitated person provision is rationally related to a legitimate government objective and thus hold that the provision is constitutional and does not violate Rodriguez's equal protection rights. A.Standing
On appeal, HealthONE argues that Rodriguez does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the incapacitated person provision. Specifically, HealthONE argues that Rodriguez lacks standing because he has failed to demonstrate how the incapacitated person provision adversely affects his rights.
"The question of standing involves a consideration of whether a plaintiff has asserted a legal basis on which a claim for relief can be predicated." Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Colo. 1992). Standing therefore is a justiciability doctrine that is concerned with a particular litigant's right to raise legal arguments or claims. Romer v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 956 P.2d 566, 572 (Colo. 1998). Because standing is a threshold jurisdictional question, we must address it first, before conducting the constitutional review of the incapacitated person provision.
In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he satisfies the requirements of the general standing analysis developed in Wimberly v. Ettenberg, 194 Colo. 163,
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