 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Company6/24/2002
any and all liability for death, personal injury or property damage resulting in any way from participating in the activities and events described above. By signing this Acknowledgement and Assumption of Risk and Release as the Parent or Guardian, I am consenting to the participant's participation in the Aspen Valley Ski Club, Inc. programs and related activities and acknowledge that I understand that all risk, whether known or unknown, is expressly assumed by me and all claims, whether known or unknown, are expressly waived in advance.
On December 30, 1995, David was training for a competitive, high speed alpine race. The course had been set by David's coach, defendant McBride. During a training run, David fell and collided with a tree, sustaining severe injuries, including the loss of vision in both eyes.
The trial court ruled that Diane Cooper's signature on the release bound her son, David, to the terms of the release and barred his claims against the Ski Club and McBride. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that based on a parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of her child, David's mother had the right to release David's claims for possible future injuries. Cooper, 32 P.3d at 507. We granted certiorari and now reverse.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate courts review a trial court's order granting or denying a motion for summary judgment de novo. Pierson v. Black Canyon Aggregates, No. 01SC161, 2002 Colo. LEXIS 424, at *12 (Colo. May 20, 2002). This is because such judgments "are rulings of law in the sense that they may not rest on the resolution of disputed facts." Id. (quoting Feiger, Collison & Killmer v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1244, 1250 (Colo. 1996)). Therefore, we decide today's issue de novo.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Validity of the Release
We must first determine whether Colorado's public policy allows parents to contractually release their child's future claims for injury caused by negligence.
While it is a well-settled principle that " minor during his minority, and acting timely on reaching his majority, may disaffirm any contract that he may have entered into during his minority," Nicholas v. People, 973 P.2d 1213, 1219 (Colo. 1999); Doenges-Long Motors v. Gillen, 138 Colo. 31, 35-36, 328 P.2d 1077, 1080 (1958), we have never specifically addressed whether a parent or guardian may release a child's cause of action on his behalf or whether Colorado's public policy allows a parent or guardian to serve as indemnitor for his minor child's claims against an indemnitee. As such, the issue in this case presents a significant question regarding the junction of contract law, tort law, and public policy.
Here, we agree with the Washington Supreme Court that "there are instances where public policy reasons for preserving an obligation of care owed by one person to another outweigh our traditional regard for freedom of contract." Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 11, 12 (Wash. 1992) (holding that "to the extent a parent's release of a third party's liability for negligence purports to bar a child's own cause of action, it violates public policy and is unenforceable"). Accordingly, we hold that Colorado's public policy affords minors significant protections which preclude parents or guardians from releasing a minor's own prospective claim for negligence. We base our holding on our understanding of Colorado's public policy to protect children as reflected by legislation protecting minors as well as decisions from other jurisdictions, which we find persuasive. However, we note that this question is a matter of legislative prerogative, and, of course, the
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Colorado Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
By using the system, you agree to TERMS OF SERVICE
|