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Cooper v. Aspen Skiing Company6/24/2002
injuries caused by another's negligence.
Thus, given our historical regard for the special needs of minors and the fact that both a pre-injury release and a post-injury one work to deprive a child of rights of recovery, the fact that a parent is not afforded unilateral power to foreclose a minor's rights in the post-injury context supports our holding that he may not do so in the pre-injury setting either.
Moreover, our case law firmly supports the proposition that Colorado's public policy works to protect minors from parental actions that foreclose a minor's rights to recovery. See, e.g., Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411, 414-15 (Colo. 1999) (holding that the statute of limitations applicable to a minor's cause of action for medical negligence does not begin to run until the minor reaches the age of eighteen, unless the minor has a court-appointed legal representative, because the language of the applicable statutory sections reflects the General Assembly's policy choice to operate literally for the protection of the minor by not allowing parents to remove or waive a minor child's legal disability by instituting a next friends suit, and thereby refusing to penalize the minor for the parents' action); Rojhani v. Arenson, 929 P.2d 23, 26 (Colo. App. 1996) (concluding that parents' failure as next friends to timely file notice of minor's injury did not preclude the minor's suit because the minor was not capable of appreciating his injury and because no guardian or personal representative was appointed); Cintron v. City of Colo. Springs, 886 P.2d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 1994) (concluding that although a parent may voluntarily undertake to aid the assertion of a child's claim by acting as a next friend, a minor may not be charged with the parents' failure, acting as next friends, to discover the minor's injury or to provide notice thereof on the parents behalf); cf., e.g., In re Miller, 790 P.2d 890, 892-93 (Colo. App. 1990) (reasoning that " he law and policy of this state is that the needs of the children are of paramount importance and cannot be altered by the parties" and holding that an agreement between parents regarding child support is not enough, in and of itself, to allow deviation from the child support guidelines and that a trial court must presume, unless rebutted, that child support obligations must be set in the amount specified in the statutory schedule).
To allow a parent or guardian to execute exculpatory provisions on his minor child's behalf would render meaningless for all practical purposes the special protections historically accorded minors. In the tort context especially, a minor should be afforded protection not only from his own improvident decision to release his possible prospective claims for injury based on another's negligence, but also from unwise decisions made on his behalf by parents who are routinely asked to release their child's claims for liability. In Colorado, it has long been the rule that courts owe a duty to "exercise a watchful and protecting care over [a minor's] interests, and not permit his rights to be waived, prejudiced or surrendered either by his own acts, or by the admissions or pleadings of those who act for him." Seaton v. Tohill, 11 Colo. App. 211, 216, 53 P. 170, 172 (1898). Nearly one hundred years later we confirmed this steadfast principle: "Courts are charged with the responsibility to take special care in protecting the rights of minor children." Abrams v. Connolly, 781 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1989). Thus, a minor is accorded special protection, and to allow a parent to release a child's possible future claims for injury caused by negligence may as a practical matter leave the minor in an unacceptably precarious position with no recou
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