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Cutsinger v. Spears Manufacturing Company6/28/2002
the statute without engaging in any statutory construction. State v. Quick Transp., Inc., 134 Idaho 240, 999 P.2d 895 (2000). If it is necessary for this Court to interpret a statute, then it will attempt to ascertain the legislative intent. Id. In construing a statute, this Court may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Id.
[The claimant] argues that the addition of subparagraph (3) to the statute was intended by the legislature to overrule Nelson. The language of subparagraph (3) is clear and unambiguous. It specifies which employer is liable ' here compensation is payable for an occupational disease.' It addresses liability for benefits for an occupational disease once that occupational disease has been compensable. Because Nelson dealt with the compensability of an occupational disease, not which employer was liable, subsection (3) clearly cannot have been intended to overrule Nelson. There is nothing in the language of subparagraph (3) that purports to change the holding of Nelson that the aggravation or acceleration of an occupational disease is not commensable unless such aggravation or acceleration results from an industrial accident. Id. at * 2.
We therefore affirm the Industrial Commission's denial of Cutsinger worker 's compensation benefits because there is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission's finding of fact, and that finding is not challenged on appeal, that Cutsinger did not suffer an accident that aggravated his pre-existing condition.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the Industrial Commission's ruling and award costs to Spears on appeal.
JUSTICES SCHROEDER, WALTERS AND EISMANN, CONCUR.
Justice KIDWELL, DISSENTING.
Upon consideration, I believe it is time to realistically interpret this problem area of the worker 's compensation law. I have been faithful to stare decisis in this troublesome and anti-worker statutory interpretation in past cases, but continuing to sign on to the idea that an accident must occur to establish an occupational disease defies logic. Therefore, I dissent with a full analysis.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Industrial Commission's conclusions of law are freely reviewable by this Court. Taylor v. Soran Rest., Inc., 131 Idaho 525, 527, 960 P.2d 1254, 1256 (1998). Factual findings will be upheld if supported by substantial, competent evidence. Id. Constitutional issues as well as the construction and application of legislative acts are questions of law subject to free review by this Court. Struhs v. Prot. Tech.'s, Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 722, 992 P.2d 164, 171 (1999).
ANALYSIS
A. Proving That A Specific Accident Aggravated Or Accelerated A Pre-existing Condition Or Disease Should No Longer Be Required For Recovery Under The Occupational Disease Theory.
According to Idaho's worker's compensation law, a claimant needs to establish that an "accident" aggravated or accelerated a pre-existing condition or disease, to be entitled to compensation under an occupational disease theory. Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 953 P.2d 989 (1998). In Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren Idgas Enters., 126 Idaho 129, 879 P.2d 592 (1994), this Court set forth a rigid definition of "accident" that has had far-reaching effects to claimants seeking recovery under Idaho's worker's compensation law. See e.g., Combes v. State, Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 130 Idaho 430, 942 P.2d 554 (1997); McGee v. J.D. Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 328, 17 P.3d 272 (2000); DeMain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging Co., 132 Idaho 782, 979 P.2d 655 (1999); Reyes v. Kit Mfg. Co., 131 Idaho 239, 953
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