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Cutsinger v. Spears Manufacturing Company6/28/2002 yer liable" statute. Id. at 241, 953 P.2d at 991. This Court observed that the 1971 recodification of the worker's compensation code eliminated the "last employer liable" statute, thus signaling the legislative intent to change the liability associated with occupational diseases. Id. This Court noted, " he legislature intended to eliminate this liability and treat occupational diseases as any other pre-existing condition when aggravation occurred in subsequent employment." Id. at 242, 953 P.2d at 992.
The appellant in this case, Cutsinger, devoted a substantial portion of his argument to a discussion of the "last employer liable" statute. According to Cutsinger, the "last employer liable" language cited by the Reyes Court was reinserted into the Code in a 1997 amendment to I.C. § 72-439. Consequently, since Reyes relied upon the absence of such language, I would hold that case is no longer good law.
I agree with Cutsinger insofar as the amendment to I.C. § 72-437 casts doubt on whether the rationale upon which Reyes is based is sound. The reinsertion of the "last employer liable" language supports the finding of this Court that a more lenient interpretation of the "accident" requirement reflects the legislative intent to hold the appropriate employer liable.
Additionally, this Court has repeatedly cited to the more lenient definition of "accident" that followed the 1971 amendment to the Idaho Code. See Nelson, 126 Idaho at 132, 879 P.2d at 595; Vernon v. Omark Industries, 113 Idaho 358, 362, 744 P.2d 86, 90 (1987) (J. Huntley, concurring). Prior to the amendment, "accident" was defined as " n unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or untoward event, happening suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs and which can be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury as defined by this law." Vernon, 113 Idaho at 362, 744 P.2d at 90 (emphasis added). The definition currently found in the Code reads: "'Accident' means an unexpected, undesigned and unlooked for mishap or untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury." I.C. § 72-102 (17)(b) (emphasis added).
"By deleting the words 'happening suddenly,' and supplanting the words 'definitely located' by the words 'reasonably located,' it is evident that this state's legislature meant to require of the claimant only such proof as to time when and place where any injury occurred as was reasonably possible." Vernon, 113 Idaho at 362-63, 744 P.2d at 90-91 (J.Huntley, concurring).
5. A more rational interpretation of the "accident" requirement is practical and promotes the policy behind the worker's compensation laws.
"The Worker's Compensation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of the claimant. The humane purposes for which it seeks to serve leaves no room for narrow, technical construction." Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho 765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990) (citing Hattenburg v. Blanks, 98 Idaho 458, 567 P.2d 3 (1977)).
Requiring a claimant to establish that a pre-existing condition was aggravated by one specific accident that occurred at an identifiable time and place is impractical. Such a requirement ignores the reality that many injuries do not immediately cause identifiable pain or symptoms. An injury may not exhibit symptoms until hours after the actual "accident" occurs. Additionally, a claimant may choose to ignore symptoms resulting from a work-related incident until the symptoms become severe enough to impair the claimant's performance. Justice Bistline, concurring in Vernon, focused on this
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