 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital6/21/2002
at has acquired a particular meaning in the law and because applying that meaning would lead to a sensible, rather than an absurd, result, I would apply the statute as the Legislature wrote it. I would, therefore, reverse the decision of the trial court.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
As the majority opinion indicates, Sally Nippa (Nippa) sued Botsford General Hospital, and only Botsford General Hospital, in her capacity as the personal representative of Robert Nippa's estate. In her second amended complaint, Nippa alleged that Botsford was liable for the negligent treatment Drs. Wiley Fan, Gerald Blackburn, and Harris Mainster rendered to Robert Nippa. With her original complaint, Nippa filed an affidavit of merit from Dr. Arnold Markowitz. Botsford sought dismissal under MCL 2.112(L). Although Dr. Markowitz is board- certified in internal medicine, Botsford pointed out that Drs. Fan and Blackburn are board- certified in infectious disease and Dr. Mainster is board-certified in general surgery; accordingly, Dr. Markowitz's board-certified specialty is not the same as those of Drs. Fan, Blackburn, and Mainster. In essence, Botsford argued that while Drs. Fan, Blackburn, and Mainster were themselves not parties, it was their alleged negligence that was being imputed to the hospital under a theory of vicarious liability. Therefore, Botsford argued, MCL 600.2169(1)(a) required Dr. Markowitz's board-certified specialties to match those of the allegedly offending physicians. The trial court agreed.
II. Statutory Provisions
Two subsections of MCL 600.2169 are at issue here. Subsection (1) provided:
(1) In an action alleging medical malpractice, a person shall not give expert testimony on the appropriate standard of practice or care unless the person is licensed as a health professional in this state or another state and meets the following criteria:
(a) If the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist, specializes at the time of the occurrence that is the basis for the action in the same specialty as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. However, if the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered is a specialist who is board certified, the expert witness must be a specialist who is board certified in that specialty.
Subsection (2) of this same statute provided:
(2) In determining the qualifications of an expert witness in an action alleging medical malpractice, the court shall, at a minimum, evaluate all of the following:
(a) The educational and professional training of the expert witness.
(b) The area of specialization of the expert witness.
(c) The length of time the expert witness has been engaged in the active clinical practice or instruction of the health profession or the specialty.
(d) The relevancy of the expert witness's testimony.
III. Standard Of Review
Here, we are interpreting statutory provisions. Therefore, our review is de novo.
IV. Statutory Interpretation
The Michigan Supreme Court has recently re-articulated the principles that courts should apply in interpreting statutes. In Roberts v Mecosta General Hospital, Justice Young, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, stated that the "anchoring rule of jurisprudence" is that courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature. Justice Young then stated:
To do so, we begin with an examination of the language of the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If the statute's languag
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Michigan Personal Injury Attorneys
Personal Injury Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to Personal Injury Lawyers in your area.
|
|