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Nippa v. Botsford General Hospital6/21/2002
e is clear and unambiguous, then we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).
A clear and unambiguous statute requires full compliance with its provisions as written. Northern Concrete Pipe, Inc v Sinacola Companies- Midwest, Inc, 461 Mich 316, 320; 603 NW2d 257 (1999).
It is well settled that when a statute provides a remedy, a court should enforce the legislative remedy rather than one the court prefers. Senters v Ottawa Savings Bank, 443 Mich 45, 56; 503 NW2d 639 (1993).
In Pohutski v City of Allen Park, Chief Justice Corrigan, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, stated that
hen parsing a statute, we presume that every word is used for a purpose. As far as possible, we give effect to every clause and sentence. "The Court may not assume that the Legislature inadvertently made use of one word or phrase instead of another." Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307 (2000). Similarly, we should take care to avoid a construction that renders any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. In re MCI [Telecommunications Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 414; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).]
In Robertson v DaimlerChrysler Corp, a case the majority cites but then shunts aside, Justice Markman, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, turned directly to the question whether courts should substitute their judgment regarding what is logical for the policies that are actually reflected in the law, stating:
he "fundamental principles" that we see at stake here implicate the role of this Court in the constitutional separation of powers. That is, we believe that it is the constitutional duty of this Court to interpret the words of the lawmaker, in this case the Legislature, and not to substitute our own policy preferences in order to make the law less "illogical."
In commenting upon the dissent's reading of subsection 301(2) of the worker's compensation act, Justice Markman observed:
The dissent interprets section § 301(2) as if these words did not exist, as if they were not there at all. The dissent ignores these words apparently because it disagrees with the limitations that these words impose on worker's compensation benefits. Thus, the dissent chooses to amend § 301(2) by summarily reading these words out of the law. In doing so, the dissent ignores the compromises and negotiations that may have preceded the inclusion of these words in the law, it ignores the concerns of the Legislature in avoiding abuse of the worker's compensation system that may have motivated such language, and ignores the majorities of each house of the Legislature, and the Governor, who approved these words, not those that the dissent prefers. However, our judicial role "precludes imposing different policy choices than those selected by the Legislature . . . ." People v Sobczak-Obetts, 463 Mich 687, 694-695; 625 NW2d 764 (2001).
Summarized, then, the Supreme Court has articulated a rather clear philosophy of statutory interpretation. The elements of this philosophy are: that if the Legislature uses language that is clear and unambiguous, courts should enforce the statute as written; that every word is used for a purpose and, as far as possible, we give effect to every clause and sentence; that we are not to assume that the Legislature inadvertently made use of one word or phrase instead of another and we should take care to avoid a construction that renders any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory; that we interpret the words of the Legislature and do not substitute our own policy preferences in order to ma
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