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Miller v. Mercy Memorial Hospital Corp.6/4/2002
ere.
Contrary to defendants' assertions, the six-month discovery rule is a distinct period of limitation. It is a statutory provision that requires a person who has a cause of action to bring suit within a specified time. As an alternative to the other periods of limitation, it is itself a period of limitation.
Section 5852 is a saving statute, not a statute of limitations. In Lindsey v Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 66; 564 NW2d 861 (1997), we stated that the purpose of § 5852 was "to preserve actions that survive death in order that the representative of the estate may have a reasonable time to pursue such actions." That purpose is fulfilled by our decision today. Had plaintiff's decedent not died, he would have been able to bring suit for six months, or until July 1996. Suit would have been timely, not under § 5805(5), but under § 5838a(2), not as an exception to the two-year statute, but as an additional period of limitation. While we said in Lindsey that § 5852 is to be narrowly construed as an exception to the statute of limitations, giving effect to its plain meaning does not violate that edict. Here, letters of authority were issued on February 26, 1996. Plaintiff therefore had two years from that date, or until February 26, 1998, to commence suit as long as suit was commenced within three years of July 1996, the date signifying the end of the applicable six-month limitation period. Because suit was commenced on October 23, 1997, it was timely.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court and Court of Appeals and remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, WEAVER, KELLY, TAYLOR, YOUNG, and MARKMAN, JJ., concurred.
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