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Cragg v. Auburn Counseling Associates6/25/2002
UNPUBLISHED
Plaintiffs appeal as of right final orders of dismissal entered following the granting of defendants' motions for summary disposition in these consolidated negligence actions. We affirm with regard to the Gragg claims, but reverse and remand with regard to the Krcmarik action.
On appeal, plaintiff Gragg argues that defendants were not entitled to summary disposition because they had a common law duty to protect plaintiff's decedent, a member of the driving public, from their psychiatric patient. We disagree. This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Because the trial court looked beyond the pleadings in reaching its decision, we will consider the motion granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). See Swan v Wedgwood Christian Youth & Family Services, Inc, 230 Mich App 190, 194; 583 NW2d 719 (1998); Ottaco, Inc v Gauze, 226 Mich App 646, 650; 574 NW2d 393 (1997).
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff must first prove a critical element--that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to avoid negligent conduct. See Baker v Arbor Drugs, Inc, 215 Mich App 198, 203; 544 NW2d 727 (1996). Generally, a person has no duty to protect another who is endangered by a third person's conduct. Murdock v Higgins, 454 Mich 46, 54; 559 NW2d 639 (1997); Marcelletti v Bathani, 198 Mich App 655, 664; 500 NW2d 124 (1993). However, such duty may arise where one stands in a special relationship with either the victim or the person causing the injury . See Jenks v Brown, 219 Mich App 415, 421; 557 NW2d 114 (1996). The psychiatrist-patient relationship is a special relationship recognized under Michigan law and results in a psychiatrist having a duty to use reasonable care to protect third parties from a patient under certain circumstances. See Marcelletti, supra. However, as this Court held in Swan, supra at 198-199, MCL 330.1946 limits that duty to reasonably identifiable third parties who are the object of a patient's threat.
Plaintiff argues that neither Swan nor MCL 330.1946 are applicable because the case does not involve a threat of violence against her decedent; however, that distinction is dispositive--defendants were not aware that their patient posed a danger to plaintiff's decedent, an unknown third party. See Swan, supra at 200-201. Consistent with longstanding principles of negligence law, both Swan and MCL 330.1946 mandate that the plaintiff and the risk of harm be reasonably foreseeable before an actionable duty arises. See, e.g., MacDonald v PKT, Inc, 464 Mich 322, 338; 628 NW2d 33 (2001); Buczkowski v McKay, 441 Mich 96, 101; 490 NW2d 330 (1992); Moning v Alfono, 400 Mich 425, 439; 254 NW2d 759 (1977); Marcelletti, supra at 665.
Here, plaintiff's decedent, a member of the driving public, was not a foreseeable plaintiff and a motor vehicle accident was not a reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from defendants' rendering negligent psychiatric treatment to Young. Plaintiff's reliance on Duvall v Goldin, 139 Mich App 342; 362 NW2d 275 (1984) is misplaced because that case is distinguishable and was decided years before MCL 330.1946 was enacted. See, also, MCR 7.215(I)(1). Accordingly, the trial court properly granted defendants' motions for summary disposition with regard to the Gragg claims.
Plaintiff Krcmarik argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it granted defendants' motions for summary disposition on the ground that the wrongful-conduct rule barred the action. We agree.
The wrongful-conduct rule provides that a plaintiff cannot maintain an action if the cause of action is based, in
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