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Parizon v. Children's Hospital of Michigan6/21/2002
2.]
We further conclude, pursuant to Kelly, supra at 35-36, and MCL 600.6301(a), that the jury could reasonably find that Melissa was not entitled to future damages.
MCL 600.6301(a) provides:
"Future damages" means damages arising from personal injury which the trier of fact finds will accrue after the damage findings are made and includes damages for medical treatment, care and custody, loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, loss of bodily function, and pain and suffering.
In the instant case, the evidence established that Melissa could not recall receiving medical treatment for her ankle and that she never took prescription pain medication for the pain she suffered. Evidence also established that while "there was nothing else" that could be done medically to treat the scar, the scar would continue to improve as Melissa got older. In addition, no evidence was presented that Melissa lost earnings or earning capacity as a result of the ankle scar, or that Melissa would need medical care as a result of the injury . Based on this evidence and because a plastic surgeon also testified that Melissa's scar would continue to improve with age, we cannot conclude that the jury award of zero dollars in future damages was clearly or grossly inadequate, against the great weight of the evidence, contrary to law, or brought on by an error of law or influenced by passion or prejudice. See also MCR 2.611(A)(1). Thus, because Kelly clearly establishes that "a court may grant a new trial following a jury verdict only for one of the reasons stated in MCR 2.611(A)(1)," on the facts presented in this case, we cannot conclude that the jury unreasonably decided not to award Melissa future damages.
Finally, we find that the jury's failure to award interest from the time of the injury until the time of the filing of the complaint is not a ground for a new trial or additur. Interest from the date of injury to the date of filing the complaint is an award that is within the purview of the jury. Capital Mortgage Corp v Coopers & Lybrand, 142 Mich App 531, 537; 369 NW2d 922 (1985), citing Vannoy v City of Warren, 26 Mich App 283, 288; 182 NW2d 65 (1970). Here, given the nature of Melissa's injury, the jury could reasonably conclude that interest should not be awarded on the $15,000 dollar verdict for past damages. Indeed, on the facts before us in this case, it is difficult to conclude when Melissa actually suffered those damages. As a result, we cannot find the jury's verdict to be unreasonable. Instead, plaintiff is only entitled to statutory interest from the time the complaint was filed until the judgment is satisfied. See MCL 600.6013.
IV. Conclusion
Because "no legal principle requires the jury to award one item of damages merely because it has awarded another item," Kelly, supra at 39, on the basis of the evidence in this case, we conclude that the jury verdict of $15,000 was reasonable, and that neither additur nor a new trial is warranted in this case. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order awarding additur, and remand for entry of judgment on the original jury verdict.
We do not retain jurisdiction.
Kurtis T. Wilder
Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
Kathleen Jansen
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