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Benson Associates6/11/2002
vens v Veenstra, 226 Mich App 441, 443; 573 NW2d 341 (1997).
VII.
Defendants next aver that the trial court failed to reduce the amount of plaintiff's judgment to its present value. Defendants suggest that because plaintiff received a breach of contract award that took into account future payments and interest, the trial court's further imposition of prejudgment interest on the jury's award resulted in a double award of interest on plaintiff's judgment. Defendants' argument that the trial court improperly applied MCL 600.6013 raises an issue of law that we review de novo. Saginaw Co v John Sexton Corp of Michigan, 232 Mich App 202, 214; 591 NW2d 52 (1998).
We first address defendants' suggestion that the trial court should not have permitted the jury to award plaintiff any commission agreement payments beyond those due and owing at the time of the 1999 trial. Evidence presented at trial supported the jury's apparent determination that Lathers repudiated or committed an anticipatory breach of the December 9 commission agreement: Lathers ceased paying plaintiff its commission after having made only the first three payments required by the December 9 agreement, and by the time of trial had made no commission payments to plaintiff for a four-year period; Lathers entered a lease agreement with Vanderbeke that instead provided that he should pay Classic Investments the monthly commission and likewise provided, at Lathers' insistence, for the partnership's indemnification of Lathers in the event plaintiff initiated legal action to recover its commission; at Vanderbeke's insistence, Lathers began making commission payments to the partnership in early 1995. See Stoddard v Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of Grand Rapids, 234 Mich App 140, 163; 593 NW2d 630 (1999) (explaining that if, before the time of performance, a party to a contract unequivocally conveys the intent not to perform the innocent party may either sue immediately for the breach or await the time for performance, and that whether a repudiation occurred depends on the party's intention manifested by acts and words).
The anticipatory breach of the December 9 commission agreement vested in plaintiff an immediate right of action to recover the entirety of the breaching party's outstanding contractual obligation. "Damages for an anticipatory repudiation are to represent full compensation for the loss caused by depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of the bargain." Stanton v Dachille, 186 Mich App 247, 252; 463 NW2d 479 (1990) (emphasis added).
Consequently, the jury properly awarded plaintiff the total amount of Bodytechniques' obligation under the December 9 agreement, $243,138 (representing 120 installment payments of the $141,223.86 commission plus 12% interest per annum), minus the three payments Lathers made, $6078.45.
Defendants' further contention that the trial court erred in imposing 12% prejudgment interest on the breach of contract award pursuant to MCL 600.6013 lacks merit. The prejudgment interest statute provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Interest shall be allowed on a money judgment recovered in a civil action, as provided in this section. However, for complaints filed on or after October 1, 1986, interest shall not be allowed on future damages from the date of filing the complaint to the date of entry of the judgment. As used in this subsection, "future damages" means that term as defined in section 6301.
(5) For complaints filed on or after January 1, 1987, if a judgment is rendered on a written instrument, interest shall be calculated from the date of filing the complaint to the date of satisfaction of the judgment at the rate of 12% per year
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