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Jackson v. CNA Insurance Co.5/31/2002
UNPUBLISHED
These consolidated appeals involve a motor vehicle accident that occurred on December 9, 1997, in which plaintiff Lakeshia Jackson and her son, Martez Cullom, allegedly were injured. Defendant CNA Insurance Company (hereinafter "defendant") was the insurer of the vehicle that plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident. In Docket No. 227093, plaintiff filed suit against defendant for uninsured motorist benefits. In Docket Nos. 227531 and 227532, plaintiff commenced separate actions for first-party no-fault benefits on behalf of herself and her son. Following a jury trial in the uninsured motorist case, the jury determined that the negligence of the uninsured motorist was not a proximate cause of any injuries to plaintiff or her son. Accordingly, the trial court entered a verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant. The court subsequently granted defendant's motion for summary disposition in the two first-party cases, concluding that, in light of the jury verdict in the uninsured motorist case, res judicata barred the actions. Plaintiff appeals as of right in all three cases, and we affirm.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by allowing defendant to introduce evidence of a subsequent accident involving plaintiff and her son in 1999. We review a trial court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Cole v Eckstein, 202 Mich App 111, 113; 507 NW2d 792 (1993).
Plaintiff argues that evidence about the 1999 accident was inadmissible because it was both irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We disagree. "Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of a fact at issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." McDonald v Stroh Brewery Co, 191 Mich App 601, 605; 478 NW2d 669 (1991); see also MRE 401. "Under MRE 403, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Haberkorn v Chrysler Corp, 210 Mich App 354, 361-362; 533 NW2d 373 (1995).
The record reveals that plaintiff was not limiting her claim for damages to those allegedly sustained only before the August 1999 accident. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by concluding that evidence of the 1999 accident was relevant to establishing the extent of plaintiff 's and her son's injuries and future damages and whether those injuries were caused by the accident in 1997. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, given the jurors' need to ascertain which, in any, of plaintiff's and her son's alleged damages were attributable to the 1997 accident. No abuse of discretion occurred.
Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by admitting the deposition testimony of Irvin Jones, plaintiff's former boss, without a proper showing that he was unavailable for trial. See MRE 804. Even assuming, arguendo, that the deposition should not have been admitted, we discern no grounds for reversal. Indeed, a error in the admission of evidence does not require reversal unless a substantial right of a party was affected. MRE 103(a); Temple v Kelel Distributing Co, 183 Mich App 326, 329-330; 454 NW2d 610 (1990). Here, plaintiff does not develop an argument regarding how the evidence prejudiced her. See Henson v Veterans Cab Co, 384 Mich 486, 494; 185 NW2d 383 (1971) (an appellant alleging evidentiary error bears the burden of showing prejudice), and Kubisz v Cadillac Gage Textron, Inc, 236 Mich App 629, 631 n 1; 601 NW2d 160 (1999) (a party may not merely announce a position and leave it to this Court to develop the supporting argument). Moreove
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