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Coho Resources6/27/2002
party in their answer, nor did they supplement that response to name Smith Brothers. As such, they waived any right they may have had to apportion fault to Smith Brothers.
C. Loss of enjoyment of life.
. Instruction P-13 allowed the jury to consider awarding damages to McCarthy's estate for any or all the following elements: mental anguish; net present cash value of future earnings; loss of enjoyment of life; loss of love, society and companionship with their father, if any, which each of McCarthy's children would have enjoyed; loss of nurture, training and guidance each child would have received, and the cost of the funeral and burial. There was no instruction which defined any of these six elements. Instruction P-15 provided for a general verdict, directing that if the jury found for the Plaintiff, they should simply fill in the blank with the one total amount.
. McCarthy's certified financial analyst did not present to the jury any testimony regarding the value of loss of enjoyment of life. There was minimal testimony from family members about what Kelvin McCarthy enjoyed doing and would be unable to enjoy due to his untimely death. In closing argument, the McCarthy's attorney mentioned specific dollar figures only for net present value of lost earnings ($327,977) mental anguish ($100,000) and loss of enjoyment of life ($817,823) but then ended his argument requesting that the jury return a verdict for $3,500,000. No further testimony was before the jury regarding loss of enjoyment of life, and no instruction gave any specific dollar amount for any of the six elements mentioned above. Because the record does not reveal whether any amount of the damages awarded by the jury was for loss of enjoyment of life, and because the question of the applicability of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life in cases where death is instantaneous is yet unanswered, we cannot say that the trial court was in error on this issue.
. In conclusion, although there may have been some defects in specific instructions, where all instructions taken as a whole fairly--although not perfectly--announce the applicable primary rules of law, reversal is not warranted. This issue is without merit.
IX. ALLOWING INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING INSURANCE.
. Coho and Cockrell next assert that the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after attorney for plaintiffs elicited testimony concerning insurance as follows:
Q: Tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what lawyers represented you in that matter when you first got sued?
A: When I first got sued?
Q: Yes, sir. Up until last week?
A: The lawyers - - the Smith Brothers insurance lawyers. (emphasis added).
. In Jackson v. Daley, 739 So.2d 1031, 1039 (Miss. 1999), we stated: "It is well established in this state that evidence of insurance or lack thereof may not be presented at a trial to show who would have to pay the judgment." However, in Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866 (Miss. 1992), we said:
The general rule that insurance should not be mentioned before a jury has long been adhered to by this Court because it was thought to prejudice a defendant. However, " he likelihood of the [defendant] being prejudiced by the mention of insurance has been diminished in recent years because most jurors, and other citizens, ... share the common knowledge [regarding coverage of] liability insurance." Such awareness has meant that the "mere mentioning of insurance in a trial is not cause for mistrial in all cases." The trial judge "is in the most advantageous position to correctly rule whether prejudice, or the lack of it, has emana
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